

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ACTOR REPORT**

Lancefly APT Group Deploys Custom Backdoor 'Merdoor' in Targeted Attacks

Date of Publication

May 16, 2023

Admiralty code

A1

TA Number

TA2023229

Summary

First Appearance: 2018

Actor Name: Lancefly


Target Region: South and Southeast Asia

Target Sectors: Government, aviation, education, and telecoms

Malware: Merdoor backdoor, ZXShell rootkit



Actor Map



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Actor Details

#1

The Lancefly advanced persistent threat (APT) group has been conducting targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia for several years. They utilize a custom-written backdoor called Merdoor, which is a powerful and fully-featured malware that has been in existence since 2018. Merdoor is used selectively, appearing on only a few networks and machines, indicating highly targeted attacks for intelligence gathering purposes. The attackers also have access to an updated version of the ZXShell rootkit. The recent targets of Lancefly's activity include government, aviation, education, and telecom sectors.

#2

The attack chain involves various tools and techniques, including credential theft using non-malware techniques like PowerShell, Reg.exe, and Avast's legitimate tool. The attackers also utilize Impacket Atexec for lateral movement, suspicious SMB activity, WinRAR for staging and encrypting files, and the LSSAS Dumper for credential theft.

#3

The ZXShell rootkit used by Lancefly is an updated version of a previously known tool, and it is used to disable antivirus software and provide additional functions. The rootkit includes a loader that drops a malicious Windows Kernel driver and creates a service. Lancefly's attack chain often includes Merdoor being injected into legitimate processes like perfhost.exe or svchost.exe, followed by suspicious SMB activity and the connection to the command-and-control server. A masqueraded WinRAR file is used to stage and encrypt files before possible exfiltration.

#4

The installation and update utility associated with Lancefly's activity shares code fragments with the Merdoor loader. It attempts to read and delete a configuration file, performs antivirus tampering, decompresses a file, and appends content from a configuration file to the decompressed file. The utility also handles installation and update functionality by decompressing a file, replacing certain system files, modifying registry values, and restarting services.

Actor Group

NAME	ORIGIN	TARGET REGIONS	TARGET INDUSTRIES
Lancefly APT	China	South and Southeast Asia	Government, aviation, education, and telecoms
	MOTIVE		
	Information theft and espionage		

Recommendations



Regularly back it up offline to protect critical data and install reliable anti-virus and internet security software on all connected devices. Enable automatic software updates whenever possible and practical. Additionally, consider implementing proactive security measures, such as blocking indicators of compromise (IoCs), to stay ahead of potential threats.



Deploy robust endpoint protection solutions, including next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and behavioral analysis tools. Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement within the infrastructure and restrict access to critical systems.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery
<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>T1057</u> Process Discovery
<u>T1014</u> Rootkit	<u>T1219</u> Remote Access Software	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1112</u> Modify Registry
<u>T1021</u> Remote Services	<u>T1003</u> OS Credential Dumping	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture	<u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow
<u>T1055</u> Process Injection	<u>T1090</u> Proxy	<u>T1056.001</u> Keylogging	<u>T1574.001</u> DLL Search Order Hijacking
<u>T1218</u> System Binary Proxy Execution	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1110</u> Brute Force
<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1218.011</u> Rundll32	<u>T1003.001</u> LSASS Memory	<u>T1036</u> Masquerading
<u>T1560.001</u> Archive via Utility	<u>T1021.002</u> SMB/Windows Admin Shares		

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA 256	13df2d19f6d2719beeff3b882df1d3c9131a292cf097b27a0ffca5f45e139581 8f64c25ba85f8b77cfba3701bebde119f610afef6d9a5965a3ed51a4a4b9dead 8e98eed2ec14621feda75e07379650c05ce509113ea8d949b7367ce00fc7cd38 89e503c2db245a3db713661d491807aab3d7621c6aff00766bc6add892411ddc c840e3cae2d280ff0b36eec2bf86ad35051906e484904136f0e478aa423d7744 5f16633dbf4e6ccf0b1d844b8ddfd56258dd6a2d1e4fb4641e2aa508d12a5075 ff4c2a91a97859de316b434c8d0cd5a31acb82be8c62b2df6e78c47f85e57740 14edb3de511a6dc896181d3a1bc87d1b5c443e6aea9eeae70dbca042a426fcf3 db5deded638829654fc1595327400ed2379c4a43e171870cfc0b5f015fad3a03 e244d1ef975fceb529f0590acf4e7a0a91e7958722a9f2f5c5c05a23dda1d2c f76e001a7ccf30af0706c9639ad3522fd8344ffbfd324307d8e82c5d52d350f2 dc182a0f39c5bb1c3a7ae259f06f338bb3d51a03e5b42903854cdc51d06fced6 fa5f32457d0ac4ec0a7e69464b57144c257a55e6367ff9410cf7d77ac5b20949 fe7a6954e18feddeeb6fcdaaa8ac9248c8185703c2505d7f249b03d8d8897104 341d8274cc1c53191458c8bbc746f428856295f86a61ab96c56cd97ee8736200 f3478ccd0e417f0dc3ba1d7d448be8725193a1e69f884a36a8c97006bf0aa0f4 750b541a5f43b0332ac32ec04329156157bf920f6a992113a140baab15fa4bd3 9f00cee1360a2035133e5b4568e890642eb556edd7c2e2f5600cf6e0bdc d5774 a9051dc5e6c06a8904bd8c82cdd6e6bd300994544af2eed72fe82df5f3336fc0 d62596889938442c34f9132c9587d1f35329925e011465c48c94aa4657c056c7 f0003e08c34f4f419c3304a2f87f10c514c2ade2c90a830b12fdf31d81b0af57 139c39e0dc8f8f4eb9b25b20669b4f30ffcbe2197e3a9f69d0043107d06a2cb4

TYPE	VALUE
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TYPE	VALUE
SHA 256	<p>10b96290a17511ee7a772fcc254077f62a8045753129d73f0804f3da577d2793</p> <p>0dcfcdf92e85191de192b4478aba039cb1e1041b1ae7764555307e257aa566a7</p> <p>415f9dc11fe242b7a548be09a51a42a4b5c0f9bc5c32aeffe7a98940b9c7fc04</p> <p>947f7355aa6068ae38df876b2847d99a6ca458d67652e3f1486b6233db336088</p> <p>8d77fe4370c864167c1a712d0cc8fe124b10bd9d157ea59db58b42dea5007b63</p> <p>d8cc2dc0a96126d71ed1fce73017d5b7c91465ccd4cdcff71712381af788c16d</p> <p>e94a5bd23da1c6b4b8aec43314d4e5346178abe0584a43fa4a204f4a3f7464b9</p> <p>5655a2981fa4821fe09c997c84839c16d582d65243c782f45e14c96a977c594e</p> <p>19ec3f16a42ae58ab6feddc66d7eeecf91d7c61a0ac9cdc231da479088486169</p> <p>41d174514ed71267aaff578340ff83ef00dbb07cb644d2b1302a18aa1ca5d2d0</p> <p>67ebc03e4fbf1854a403ea1a3c6d9b19fd9dc2ae24c7048aafbfff76f1bea675</p> <p>f92cac1121271c2e55b34d4e493cb64cdb0d4626ee30dc77016eb7021bf63414</p> <p>859e76b6cda203e84a7b234c5cba169a7a02bf028a5b75e2ca8f1a35c4884065</p> <p>fcdec9d9b195b8ed827fb46f1530502816fe6a04b1f5e740fda2b126df2d9fd5</p> <p>9584df964369c1141f9fc234c64253d8baeb9d7e3739b157db5f3607292787f2</p> <p>711a347708e6d94da01e4ee3b6cdb9bcc96ebd8d95f35a14e1b67def2271b2e9</p> <p>f040a173b954cdeadede3203a2021093b0458ed23727f849fc4c2676c67e25db</p> <p>90edb2c7c3ba86fecc90e80ac339a42bd89fbaa3f07d96d68835725b2e9de3ba</p> <p>b0d25b06e59b4cca93e40992fa0c0f36576364fcf1aca99160fd2a1faa5677a2</p> <p>4c55f48b37f3e4b83b6757109b6ee0a661876b41428345239007882993127397</p> <p>3e1c8d982b1257471ab1660b40112adf54f762c570091496b8623b0082840e9f</p> <p>9830f6abec64b276c9f327cf7c6817ad474b66ea61e4adcb8f914b324da46627</p> <p>79ae300ac4f1bc7636fe44ce2faa7e5556493f7013fc5c0a3863f28df86a2060</p>

References


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