

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **PowerExchange Backdoor and Web Shells Breach at UAE Government Agency**

Date of Publication

May 26, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023247

# Summary

**First appeared:** April, 2023

**Attack Region:** UAE

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Malware:** PowerExchange

**Targeted Industry:** Government

**Attack:** A high-severity attack targeted a UAE government agency, utilizing a custom PowerShell backdoor named PowerExchange and web shells on Microsoft Exchange servers.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

A series of attacks targeted a government agency in the United Arab Emirates, involving the use of several known threats and a custom PowerShell-based backdoor called PowerExchange. The attacks were attributed to an Iranian threat actor, and the severity level was considered high. The infection chain started with email phishing, where a user opened a malicious zip file containing a disguised executable file.

## #2

This dropper installed and executed the final payload, which created a persistent backdoor on the compromised system. The PowerExchange backdoor utilized the Exchange Web Services (EWS) API to connect to the victim's Microsoft Exchange server, enabling communication through email-based commands. The backdoor supported various commands for data exfiltration and executing further malicious actions.


## #3

The investigation also uncovered the presence of other implants, such as web shells, on Microsoft Exchange servers and domain controllers. The web shells, including ExchangeLeech, had the capability to harvest credentials and execute commands. The attack is believed to have been carried out by the suspected threat actor APT34.

# Recommendations



**Patch and update systems:** Regularly apply security patches and updates to all software and systems, including Windows platforms and Microsoft Exchange servers. Promptly addressing known vulnerabilities can prevent attackers from exploiting them.



**Enhance email security measures:** Strengthen email security by implementing robust spam filters, anti-phishing technologies, and email filtering solutions. Train employees to recognize and report suspicious emails, particularly those with malicious attachments or links.



**Implement network monitoring and access controls:** Deploy comprehensive network monitoring tools and intrusion detection systems to detect any unusual or malicious activity. Monitor Exchange server logs and network traffic for signs of compromise. Enforce strong access controls, such as least privilege, to restrict unauthorized access to critical systems.

## Potential **MITRE ATT&CK** TTPs

<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation	<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access
<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion	<b><u>TA0007</u></b> Discovery	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1007</u></b> System Service Discovery
<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution	<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1204.002</u></b> Malicious File	<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<b><u>T1505</u></b> Server Software Component	<b><u>T1083</u></b> File and Directory Discovery	<b><u>T1505.003</u></b> Web Shell	<b><u>T1132</u></b> Data Encoding
<b><u>T1132.001</u></b> Standard Encoding	<b><u>T1041</u></b> Exfiltration Over C&C Channel	<b><u>T1071.001</u></b> Web Protocols	<b><u>T1071</u></b> Application Layer Protocol
<b><u>T1566.001</u></b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b><u>T1204.002</u></b> Malicious File	<b><u>T1053</u></b> Scheduled Task/Job	<b><u>T1053.005</u></b> Scheduled Task
<b><u>T1059.001</u></b> Powershell	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading	<b><u>T1036.004</u></b> Masquerade Task or Service	<b><u>T1036.005</u></b> Match Legitimate Name or Location
<b><u>T1135</u></b> Network Share Discovery	<b><u>T1570</u></b> Lateral Tool Transfer		

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>MD5</b>	f18575065970ef36e613ffa046f381fe9b01b3e9 2ba23d9115fb1c1d4c5899d34dc4772631d77eda 2b995ce4656db7257451080111705d5b98b45df3 68299DF5D8CE52845A8FC10598F138840094181C d82aad3222664ec9fb112808dfabbb56de9aa770 70aaa46784a2abd8af5628cb94f876d57fe8d154 fd3750d809f6ff9cf2b49d7a63f8f3fa0a457f61

TYPE	VALUE
File Path	C:\Windows\Microsoft[.]NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System[.]Web[.]Handler\ v4[.]0_1[.]0[.]0[.]0_9cbc39238c01012f\System[.]Web[.]Handler[.]dll C:\Windows\Microsoft[.]NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System[.]Web[.]Roles\ v4[.]0_1[.]0[.]0[.]0_9cbc39238c01012f\System[.]Web[.]Roles[.]dll C:\Users\Public\System[.]Web[.]Handler[.]dll C:\Windows\temp\temp[.]ps1 C:\Users\Public\temp[.]ps1 C:\Windows\System32\System[.]Web[.]TransportClient[.]dll C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\System[.]Web[.]TransportClient[.]dll C:\Windows\Mirosoft[.]NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System[.]Web[.]TransportClient\ v4[.]0_1[.]0[.]0[.]0_9cbc39238c01012f\System[.]Web[.]TransportClient[.]dll C:\Windows\Microsoft[.]NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System[.]Web[.]ServiceAuthentication\ v4[.]0_1[.]0[.]0[.]0_ff08ceb7abd6adf3\System[.]Web[.]ServiceAuthentication[.]dll C:\Users\Public\MicrosoftEdge\autosave[.]exe C:\Users\Public\MicrosoftEdge\wsdl[.]ps1 C:\Users\Public\MicrosoftEdge\Microsoft[.]Exchange[.]WebServices[.]dll C:\Users\Public\MicrosoftEdge\config[.]conf
URLs	hxxps://enmckkb0t0v3[.]x[.]pipedream[.]net?n=my
File Name	Brochure[.]zip Brochure[.]exe MicrosoftEdgeUpdateService

## References


<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-powerexchange-malware-backdoors-microsoft-exchange-servers/>

<https://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/news/hackers-use-new-powerexchange-malware-to-target-microsoft-exchange-servers/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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**May 26, 2023 • 4:30 AM**

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