



Threat Level



HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY



## ATTACK REPORT

### Turla Updates KAZUAR Backdoor to Target Ukraine's Defense Sector

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023309

# Summary

**First Appearance:** 2022

**Attack Region:** Ukraine and Eastern Europe

**Actor Name:** Turla (aka Waterbug , Venomous Bear , Group 88 , SIG2 , SIG15 , SIG23 , Iron Hunter , CTG-8875 , Pacifier APT , ATK 13 , ITG12 , Makersmark , Krypton , Belugasturgeon , Popeye , Wraith , TAG-0530 , UNC4210 , SUMMIT , Secret Blizzard , Pensive Ursus)

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Malware:** DeliveryCheck (aka CAPIBAR, GAMEDAY), KAZUAR

**Targeted Industries:** Defense, Government, Military, Aerospace

**Attack:** Turla's Kazuar variant remains a persistent threat, accompanied by a new .NET-based backdoor, DeliveryCheck, attributed to Russian actor Turla. The attacks target Ukraine's defense sector, utilizing tactics like PowerShell DSC and signaling a dynamic cybersecurity landscape.

## ⚔️ Attack Regions



Turla APT group

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# Attack Details

#1

While tracking the evolution of Turla (aka Pensive Ursu, Uroburos), researchers discovered a new variant of Kazuar, an advanced and stealthy .NET backdoor. This variant was found in a campaign targeting the Ukrainian defense sector. Turla, a Russian-based threat group linked to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), has been using Kazuar as a second-stage payload since at least 2004.

#2

The new Kazuar variant significantly improves code structure and functionality, offering comprehensive system profiling, credential theft from cloud and sensitive applications, extended command sets, and enhanced automation. The malware emphasizes encryption, obfuscation, and anti-dumping mechanisms to evade detection and analysis.

#3

In addition to the Kazuar discovery, a .NET-based backdoor called DeliveryCheck (also known as CAPIBAR or GAMEDAY) has been targeting the defense sector in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The attacks have been attributed to a Russian nation-state actor called Turla, which is associated with Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).

#4

DeliveryCheck is distributed through malicious macros in email attachments and persists via scheduled tasks that download and launch it in memory. It communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve tasks, which can include launching arbitrary payloads embedded in XSLT stylesheets.

#5

Notably, DeliveryCheck can breach Microsoft Exchange servers and employs PowerShell Desired State Configuration (DSC) to install a server-side component that turns legitimate servers into malware C2 centers.

#6

The attacks involve the distribution of a known Turla implant called Kazuar, capable of stealing data from web browsers, application configuration files, and event logs. The ultimate goal of these attacks is to exfiltrate messages from the Signal messaging app on Windows systems, enabling the attacker to access sensitive conversations, documents, and images.

#7

Previously, the [Turla Group](#) distributed KOPILUWAK reconnaissance software and the QUIETCANARY backdoor to victims of ANDROMEDA malware in Ukraine.

#8

This update highlights the evolving tactics of threat actors like Turla and Turla, showcasing the constant development and deployment of sophisticated malware tools in targeted campaigns against critical sectors. Security practitioners are advised to stay vigilant, incorporating the provided insights to enhance their cybersecurity defenses.

# Recommendations

**Keep Software Up-to-Date:** Ensure that all software, including operating systems, applications, and security tools, is regularly updated with the latest patches and security updates. This helps to address known vulnerabilities that attackers may exploit.

**Email Security Measures:** Employ robust email security solutions to detect and block malicious attachments and links. Consider using advanced threat protection (ATP) and email filtering technologies to prevent the delivery of emails containing malicious macros.

**Endpoint Protection:** Deploy reputable endpoint protection software that includes anti-malware and behavior-based detection capabilities to identify and block suspicious activities on endpoints.

**Network Segmentation:** Implement network segmentation to restrict lateral movement in case of a breach. Isolate critical systems and sensitive data to minimize the potential impact of a security incident.

## ✿ Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u>	<u>TA0002</u>	<u>TA0040</u>	<u>TA0043</u>
Initial Access	Execution	Impact	Reconnaissance
<b>TA0010</b>	<b>TA0005</b>	<b>TA0009</b>	<b>TA0011</b>
Exfiltration	Defense Evasion	Collection	Command and Control
<b>TA0003</b>	<b>T1059.001</b>	<b>T1059</b>	<b>T1220</b>
Persistence	PowerShell	Command and Scripting Interpreter	XSL Script Processing
<b>T1005</b>	<b>T1027</b>	<b>T1027.009</b>	<b>T1547</b>
Data from Local System	Obfuscated Files or Information	Embedded Payloads	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
<b>T1567</b>	<b>T1105</b>	<b>T1053</b>	<b>T1053.005</b>
Exfiltration Over Web Service	Ingress Tool Transfer	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task
<b>T1090</b>	<b>T1104</b>	<b>T1055</b>	<b>T1190</b>
Proxy	Multi-Stage Channels	Process Injection	Exploit Public-Facing Application

<b>T1546</b> Event Triggered Execution	<b>T1566.001</b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b>T1566</b> Phishing	<b>T1041</b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
<b>T1070</b> Indicator Removal	<b>T1573</b> Encrypted Channel	<b>T1056</b> Input Capture	<b>T1110</b> Brute Force
<b>T1562</b> Impair Defenses	<b>T1102</b> Web Service	<b>T1113</b> Screen Capture	<b>T1053</b> Scheduled Task/Job

## ☒ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	11a289347b95aab157aa0efe4a59bf24, 153b713b3c6e642f39993d65ab33c5f0, 17402fc21c7bafae2c1a149035cd0835, 4065e647380358d22926c24a63c26ac4, 420b7dc391f2cb0a9a684c1c48c334e2, 491e462bf1213fede82925dea5df8fff, 5210b3d85fd0026205baee2c77ac0acd, 5c7466a177fcaad2ebab131a54c28fab, 65102299bf8d7f0129ebbc08a9c2d98, 8c56c22343853d3797037bdac2cec6c7, 9dd2bea4f2df8d3ef51dc10c6db2e07a, 9ececb4acbf692c2a8ea411f2e7dd006, b63c2ec9a631e0217d39c4a43527a0ce, cba1f4c861240223332922d2913d18e5, cdf7fa901701ea1ef642aeb271c70361, D3065b4b1e8f6ecb63685219113ff0b8, 169739e7211295146a61d300c0fef02d
SHA256	01c5778be73c10c167fae6d7970c0be23a29af1873d743419b1803c035d 92ef7, 07f9b090172535089eb62a175e5deaf95853fdfd4bcabf099619c60057d3 8c57, 19b7ddd3b06794abe593bf533d88319711ca15bb0a08901b4ab7e52aab 015452, 1c1bb64e38c3fbe1a8f0dc94ded96b332296bcbf839de438a4838fb43b2 0af3, 1c97f92a144ac17e35c0e40dc89e12211ef5a7d5eb8db57ab093987ae6f3 b9dc, 4ef8db0ca305aaab9e2471b198168021c531862cb4319098302026b1cfa 89947,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	5cf64f37fac74dc8f3dcb58831c3f2ce2b3cf522db448b40acdab254dd46cb3e, 5e122ff3066b6ef2a89295df925431c151f1713708c99772687a30c3204064bd, 64e8744b39e15b76311733014327311acd77330f8a135132f020eac78199ac8a, 8168dc0baea6a74120fbabea261e83377697cb5f9726a2514f38ed04b46c56c8, 91dc8593ee573f3a07e9356e65e06aed58d8e74258313e3414a7de278b3b5233, AAF7642f0cab75240ec65bc052a0a602366740b31754156b3a0c44dccec9bebe, b8ee794b04b69a1ee8687daabfe4f912368a500610a099e3072b03eeb66077f8, ba2c8df04bcba5c3cf343a59d8b59b76779e6c27eb27b7ac73ded97e08f0f39, bd7dbaf91ba162b6623292ebcdd2768c5d87e518240fe8ca200a81e9c7f01d76, 01c5778be73c10c167fae6d7970c0be23a29af1873d743419b1803c035d92ef7, 07f9b090172535089eb62a175e5deaf95853fdfd4bcabf099619c60057d38c57, 19b7ddd3b06794abe593bf533d88319711ca15bb0a08901b4ab7e52aab015452, 1c1bb64e38c3fbe1a8f0dc94ded96b332296bcbf839de438a4838fb43b20af3, 1c97f92a144ac17e35c0e40dc89e12211ef5a7d5eb8db57ab093987ae6f3b9dc, 4ef8db0ca305aaab9e2471b198168021c531862cb4319098302026b1cfa89947, 5cf64f37fac74dc8f3dcb58831c3f2ce2b3cf522db448b40acdab254dd46cb3e, 5e122ff3066b6ef2a89295df925431c151f1713708c99772687a30c3204064bd, 64e8744b39e15b76311733014327311acd77330f8a135132f020eac78199ac8a, 8168dc0baea6a74120fbabea261e83377697cb5f9726a2514f38ed04b46c56c8, 91dc8593ee573f3a07e9356e65e06aed58d8e74258313e3414a7de278b3b5233, AAF7642f0cab75240ec65bc052a0a602366740b31754156b3a0c44dccec9bebe, b8ee794b04b69a1ee8687daabfe4f912368a500610a099e3072b03eeb66077f8, ba2c8df04bcba5c3cf343a59d8b59b76779e6c27eb27b7ac73ded97e08f0f39, bd7dbaf91ba162b6623292ebcdd2768c5d87e518240fe8ca200a81e9c7f01d76, 91dc8593ee573f3a07e9356e65e06aed58d8e74258313e3414a7de278b3b5233, d4d7c12bdb66d40ad58c211dc6dd53a7494e03f9883336fa5464f0947530709f

TYPE	VALUE
Hostname	www[.]pierreagencement[.]fr
URLs	http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/, http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/?page=, http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/fg/message, http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/fg/music, http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/fg/video, http://aleimportadora[.]net/images/slides_logo/index[.]php, http://atomydoc[.]kg/src/open_center/, http://atomydoc[.]kg/src/open_center/?page=ccl, http://atomydoc[.]kg/src/open_center/?page=fst, http://atomydoc[.]kg/src/open_center/?page=snd, http://atomydoc[.]kg/src/open_center/?page=trd, http://mail[.]aet[.]in[.]ua/outlook/api/logoff[.]aspx, http://mail[.]aet[.]in[.]ua/outlook/api/logon[.]aspx, http://mail[.]arlingtonhousing[.]us/outlook/api/logoff[.]aspx, http://mail[.]kzp[.]bg/outlook/api/logoff[.]aspx, http://mail[.]kzp[.]bg/outlook/api/logon[.]aspx, http://mail[.]lebsack[.]de/MICROSOFT[.]EXCHANGE[.]MAILBOXREPLICATI ONSERVICE[.]PROXYSERVICE/RPCWITHCERT/SYNC, http://mail[.]lechateaudelatour[.]fr/MICROSOFT[.]EXCHANGE[.]MAILBOX REPLICATIONSERVICE[.]PROXYSERVICE/RPCWITHCERT/SYNC, http://mail[.]numina[.]md/owa/scripts/logon[.]aspx, http://octoberoctopus[.]co[.]za/wp-includes/sitemaps/web/, http://sansaispa[.]com/wp-includes/images/gallery/, http://www[.]adelaida[.]ua/plugins/vmsearch/wp-config-plugins[.]php, http://www[.]adelaida[.]ua/plugins/vmsearch/wp-config-themes[.]php, http://www[.]adelaida[.]ua/plugins/vmsearch/wp-file-script[.]js, http://www[.]pierreagencement[.]fr/wp-content/languages/index[.]php, https://www[.]pierreagencement[.]fr/wp- content/languages/index[.]php, https://octoberoctopus[.]co[.]za/wp-includes/sitemaps/web/, https://sansaispa[.]com/wp-includes/images/gallery/
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