

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

Dissemination of the Konni Campaign Through Malicious Documents

Date of Publication

November 24, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023474

Summary

Attack Began: September 2023

Attack Region: Russia

Affected Platform: Microsoft Windows

Attack: The Konni campaign has resurfaced in a new phishing attack employing a Russian-language Microsoft Word document to distribute malware. The malicious software aims to harvest sensitive information from compromised Windows hosts.

🗡️ Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

In a recent Konni Campaign, a Russian-language Microsoft Word document was used to deliver malware designed for harvesting sensitive information from compromised Windows hosts. This campaign involves a remote access trojan (RAT) that allows remote attackers to assume control of the infected systems, facilitating the extraction of information and execution of commands as part of its malicious activities.

#2

Konni's primary objectives encompass data espionage activities. The most recent observed attack involves the use of a macro-laced Word document. Upon enabling the macros, the document displays an article in Russian, purportedly discussing "Western Assessments of the Progress of the Special Military Operation."

#3

The VBA script extracts information from "OLEFormat.IconLabel" and saves it in a temporary folder. It then runs the "check.bat" script with the "vbHide" parameter to execute silently. The script verifies the presence of remote connection sessions, Windows 10 operating systems, and 64-bit architectures. If these conditions are met, it triggers the "netpp.bat" script.

#4

The "check.bat" batch file employs "wpns.dll" to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by launching "wusa.exe," a legitimate Windows utility. This process operates with elevated privileges, duplicates its access token, and executes a command via "CreateProcessWithLogonW". It then executes a "netpp.bat" script, inheriting the elevated privileges and copying the final payload, creating service and registry entries for persistence.

#5

The DLL files embedded within the Word document are compressed using UPX. The utilization of these batch scripts and DLL files reveals an advanced toolset employed by a highly skilled threat actor within a Word document. Users are advised to exercise caution when opening any suspicious documents, as this malware is continuously evolving.

Recommendations



Educate Users: Train users to be cautious when opening email attachments, especially those from unknown or unexpected sources. Warn them about the potential dangers of enabling macros in documents to prevent successful phishing attempts.



Robust Endpoint Security: Deploy advanced endpoint security solutions that include real-time malware detection and behavioral analysis. Regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software to ensure the latest threat definitions are in place. A multi-layered approach to endpoint security can prevent malwares from infiltrating the network through vulnerable endpoints and can detect and block malicious activities effectively.



Network Segmentation: Implement proper network segmentation to limit the lateral movement of malware within the network. By dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments, organizations can contain the spread of malware and prevent it from accessing critical systems and sensitive data.



Implement Behavioral Analysis: Deploy advanced security solutions that employ behavioral analysis and anomaly detection to identify unusual patterns of activity indicative of malware presence. This proactive approach can help catch sophisticated threats before they fully compromise your systems.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration
<u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1134</u> Access Token Manipulation	<u>T1569</u> System Services
<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1543.003</u> Windows Service	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1059.005</u> Visual Basic	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1560</u> Archive Collected Data
<u>T1548</u> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

🔗 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	kmdqj1[.]c1[.]biz, ouvxu2[.]c1[.]biz, 9b31n8[.]c1[.]biz, 3pl0y5[.]c1[.]biz, dpgbep[.]c1[.]biz, 7qnbae[.]c1[.]biz, glws5m[.]c1[.]biz, ewqqa4[.]c1[.]biz, 3897lb[.]c1[.]biz, 558ga9[.]c1[.]biz, b91stf[.]c1[.]biz, bg5pl1[.]c1[.]biz, caoy9n[.]c1[.]biz, rziju6[.]c1[.]biz, pm90p1[.]c1[.]biz, pxyunf[.]c1[.]biz, m2jymd[.]c1[.]biz, aocsfff[.]c1[.]biz, 6e2nbc[.]c1[.]biz, vqt9i1[.]c1[.]biz
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
🔗 References

<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/konni-campaign-distributed-via-malicious-document>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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