

Threat Level

# HiveForce Labs THREAT ADVISORY



### The Zardoor Backdoor's Silent Takeover of Saudi Charities

Date of Publication

February 13, 2024

Admiralty Code

TA Number TA2024055

A1

# Summary

First Seen: March 2021 Malware: Zardoor backdoor Targeted Industries: Non-profit organization Attack Region: Saudi Arabia

**Attack:** An espionage operation, designed to distribute a backdoor called Zardoor, was uncovered with evidence suggesting it dates back to March 2021. In May 2023, this meticulously orchestrated campaign specifically targeted non-profit organizations in Saudi Arabia.

### X Attack Regions

THREAT ADVISORY • ATTACK REPORT (Amber)

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## **Attack Details**

### **#1**

A covert espionage campaign was orchestrated to propagate an undisclosed backdoor known as Zardoor, believed to have persisted since at least March 2021. In May 2023, non-profit entities in Saudi Arabia fell victim to this meticulously executed campaign.

#2

The perpetrators employed a sophisticated multi-chain attack methodology, leveraging living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) and reverse proxy tools. Additionally, they adeptly tailored open-source instruments, allowing them to maintain persistent access to the targeted network for an extended duration without evoking suspicion.

#3

The precise method used to initially breach the targeted entity remains elusive. The unidentified infection pathway sets the stage for the deployment of a dropper component, subsequently installing a malicious dynamic-link library responsible for unleashing two backdoor modules, namely "zar32.dll" and "zor32.dll."

#4

The former serves as the core backdoor element, facilitating Command and Control (C2) communications, while the latter ensures the deployment of "zar32.dll" with elevated administrator privileges. The threat actor utilized Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for lateral movement, disseminating the attacker's tools, including Zardoor.

#5

This was achieved by initiating processes on the target system and executing commands received from the C2. Zardoor exhibits capabilities such as data exfiltration, remote execution of fetched executables and shellcode, updating the C2 IP address, and self-deletion from the host.

### Recommendations

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**Continuous Monitoring and Analysis:** Establish continuous monitoring and analysis protocols to promptly detect any unusual network behavior, potentially indicating a long-term cyber espionage operation.



**Network Segmentation:** Employ network segmentation to isolate critical systems and sensitive data, limiting the lateral movement of an attacker within the network in case of a successful infiltration.



**Heighten Awareness:** Familiarize yourself with common phishing tactics and deceptive strategies employed by threat actors. Knowing the signs of malicious activity can help you avoid falling victim to scams.

#### Potential <u>MITRE ATT&CK</u> TTPs

TA0002 Execution	TA0003 Persistence	TA0004 Privilege Escalation	TA0005 Defense Evasion
TA0010 Exfiltration	TA0011 Command and Control	T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading	T1018 Remote System Discovery
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery	T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation	T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
T1053.005 Scheduled Task	T1055 Process Injection	T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection	T1057 Process Discovery
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell	T1070.004 File Deletion	T1087.002 Domain Account	T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer	T1204.002 Malicious File	A Pro-	2 

#### **X** Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
SHA256	f71f7c68209ea8218463df397e5c39ef5f916f138dc001feb3a60ef585bd 2ac2, c6419df4bbda5b75ea4a0b8e8acd2100b149443584390c91a218e7735 561ef74, 73c7459e0c3ba00c0566f7baa710dd8b88ef3cf75ee0e76d36c5d8cd73 083095, 1480b2038395f9edd2c21dff68eb29a4d6177708b70b687f758af60c8b 02f071, 29741f7987ab61b85adb310a7ab2f44405822f1719fa431c8f49007b64f 6f5cd, 5226b67b5d49720981841fab64794533fe0530409ba2975e6125a4bc0 08f2480, 7905bd9bb4d277a81935a22f975a0030faa9e5c9dbb9f6152c2f56ba1c d0cdea, a99a9f2853ff0ca5b91767096c7f7e977b43e62dd93bde6d79e3407bc0 1f661d,

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
SHA256	0058d495254bf3760b30b5950d646f9a38506cef8f297c49c3b73c208a b723bf, d267e2a6311fe4e2dfd0237652223add300b9a5233b555e131325a261 2e1d7ef, 5eeab7b795a3303c368c72ef09a345f3a4f02301ec443e98319d600e82 87e852, 4b16ea1b1273f8746cf399c71bfc1f5bff7378b5414b4ea044c55e0ee08 c89d3, 3adcc81446f0e8ed1a2bc1e815613eb5622afba57941d651faa2b5bc4b 2f13c1, 5655a2981fa4821fe09c997c84839c16d582d65243c782f45e14c96a97 7c594e, 1aea1e7098221f2cc76ccd45078d9a216236b4e7e295dfa68e8a25aab3 abe778, d7dfa7009a9d808b744df8ed4f5852bd03ffb82f7a07a258ea8b5e0290f b7d87, 7abf74260ae5b771182e95bc360fefa1b635b56b3aa05922506d55c5d1 5517c3, d5d16d9bb75d461922eade2597c233255871dc74659f0169f3d3f40f52 73ab71, b5b3627606a5c5e720fa32fb9cb90aa813c630673d23c97a81012b8327 99a897, 0a5aa03e35d6d9218342b2bec753a9800570c000964801cf6bfe45a9bb 393c0d
IPv4:PORT	70[.]34[.]208[.]197:10086, 140[.]82[.]33[.]130:14443, 70[.]34[.]194[.]185:14443, 139[.]84[.]232[.]245:37135, 208[.]85[.]20[.]130:37135, 139[.]84[.]229[.]192:443, 70[.]34[.]195[.]221:443, 217[.]69[.]1[.]128:14443, 108[.]181[.]20[.]36:443, 108[.]61[.]189[.]125:443
Domain	lapz[.]ddns[.]net, exchangeupgrade[.]ddns[.]net, exchangeserver[.]zapto[.]org
Mutexes	3e603a07-7b2d-4a15-afef-7e9a0841e4d5, 6c2711b5-e736-4397-a883-0d181a3f85ae, ThreadMutex12453

#### **S** References

https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-zardoor-backdoor/

## What Next?

At **<u>Hive Pro</u>**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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#### Contextualize

Uni5 Threat Exposure Management

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