

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

Cybercriminals Forge Alliances via Compromised Routers

Date of Publication

May 3, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024172

Summary

Attack Commenced: April 2022


Threat Actor: APT 28 (aka Pawn Storm, Sofacy, Fancy Bear, Sednit, Group 74, TG-4127, Tsar Team, Strontium, Swallowtail, SIG40, Snakemackerel, Iron Twilight, ATK 5, T-APT-12, ITG05, TAG-0700, UAC-0028, FROZENLAKE, Grey-Cloud, Grizzly Steppe, Forest Blizzard, BlueDelta, TA422, Fighting Ursa, Blue Athena)

Attack Region: Worldwide

Targeted Industries: Aerospace, Defense, Education, Energy, Utilities, Governments, Hospitality, Manufacturing, Oil & Gas, Retail, Technology, Transportation

Attack: APT28 threat actors utilized compromised EdgeRouters to execute covert cyber operations, repurposing Ubiquiti EdgeRouter routers for a range of nefarious activities. With root access to compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, they possess unrestricted control over Linux-based operating systems, allowing for the installation of tools and the concealment of their identities during malicious campaigns.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

As early as 2022, APT28 operatives had used compromised EdgeRouters to conduct covert cyber operations. These compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouter routers were repurposed for various malicious activities, including Secure Shell (SSH) brute forcing, distributing pharmaceutical spam, employing server message block (SMB) reflectors in NTLMv2 hash relay attacks, proxying stolen credentials on phishing sites, providing multifunctional proxy services, engaging in cryptocurrency mining, and sending out spear phishing emails.

#2

Cybercriminals lease out these compromised routers to other criminals and likely also offer them to commercial residential proxy providers. Internet routers remain prime targets for threat actors due to their relatively weak security oversight, lenient password policies, infrequent updates, and the potential use of robust operating systems capable of hosting malware such as cryptocurrency miners, proxies, distributed denial of service (DDoS) agents, malicious scripts, and web servers.

#3

Consumer-grade internet devices like Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers are also favored assets for criminal enterprises and espionage. With root access to compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, APT28 threat actor have unrestricted control, enabling them to install tools and conceal their identities while executing malicious campaigns.

Recommendations



Check SSH Banner: Utilize the verbose option of your SSH command-line client to inspect the banner of your EdgeRouter device. Look for the presence of the "Debian" string and ensure that the OpenSSH version matches an official release number.



Verify GatewayPorts Configuration: Log in to your device via the web administration page to enable telnet temporarily. Then, log in via telnet and search for sshd_config files. Check if the GatewayPorts configuration option is set to "yes". If you do not recognize this setting, it could indicate compromise.



Verify Binary Hashes: Check your device's hashes of all sshd binaries. If any match with indicators of compromise (IOCs), it suggests a potential compromise.



Limit Internet Access to Administrative Interface: Consider restricting connections to the router's administrative interface from the Internet to minimize the attack surface.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access
<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses	<u>T1556</u> Modify Authentication Process
<u>T1055</u> Process Injection	<u>T1587</u> Develop Capabilities	<u>T1584</u> Compromise Infrastructure	<u>T1203</u> Exploitation for Client Execution
<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1546</u> Event Triggered Execution	<u>T1557</u> Adversary-in-the-Middle	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1219</u> Remote Access Software	<u>T1018</u> Remote System Discovery	<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1562.001</u> Disable or Modify Tools
<u>T1588</u> Obtain Capabilities			

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	95995686b9af8b56c3fed1dadccf8b2ed5f417bb4eb8947a406a6e943cca33c6, 85a4151d790ab32d5321c6e71748b2446032e1775aedd0168be25f76bf4fe93f, edefd297285090fe743f5c3b111bce54da40f43a32e15d8fa87b8a2c243f6d47,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	2847ae693533406defecb226bfe6d62dd36905ff07add4e773426bde83e85ddc, ef6fe4140001cb099968acd5772452859adbe7b57496389fbbf2342f9047b962, 944be9bb167a2f76fe2f539d3860bbf26301830c479bc68509af46e047993c8c, 104e3ea9a190ba039488f5200824fe883b98f6fe01d05a1b55e15ed2199c807a, 4a932ccc8a45db6897a11de118cdbf67062569112f1caa69793669c5c24be708, 17257ce42246b8c47f9ec639a6ffaca2bc14c21a22c4419bf468e3f1d491e330, 4d35ae9669db428b72b1aaadd21dbed44ad2fc678efc8110d89ff723e0497406, dfc86b375e974b3092bbff41eb24db3281fb4fc104f1043a7afb95f85a2c1d5, f88d12332d2f58459f989c7c41b5381e8aed9c8c30c1d11373f0d1eb0b340b9a, a4a95807f1c5b200d5d94e3e811a7c4af2d0d9ca88ca4d7f9d02015574f4716f, 681a00df2e2cc680a4b68bdb6fe7d55c34d6d3fc35d462c78ebb659f9cb2cd60, e3ba85e0bc978013b145ebb4c2d583b33422da93787ab8fb2185b55478652d91, fed8c98fc754aff95f8538b5bebbe558eb274256b0265d4482a675b74e93cc93, ad3fd3eb7a3a276ec0d384afb5b75fe7d9fc047bb0dab40f9d55870d4520c1f3, 0891588667da40da58ffaa8fedcddb0a9a172646ec12e6d0b9ce2acc2caa302b, bd0ea597f24bb72f8db34b6b6d2c0bc70eb53df9eae40cdb216a13521145ab03, 28aee94e9a3f6c4296663bb853a5af5817ae109f066c88b7a245316a9a1e4712, 2ae805b68d7408cc40ad058bc0b8b2b5c29d77760084a5230448e47cec1c43f4, 2f182a6cb72712c340c2adb43843cfccb5916d236485de1c62fb40c883570824, 53d687868fd7ab9e78aa09f696923bd3c057e4e50432d07210080474a8d879cb, 844cc1807cc5b628b7aa807ef3b682d051c8ad5427df3d3e36c7e7633bfc5768, c290ab5d8ce9fcaa91da3b488c93dee1a4d0581c1335f19cb48027a5a03fe525,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	88f2d42bf225c930bc644f82bbd229e170d53dd1072e846e2883265a7ac33301, f6541b569787aa050c54ad85976ac5b729697a022be188b0040d37aa91e49ae2
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TYPE	VALUE
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References


https://www.trendmicro.com/en_in/research/24/e/router-roulette.html

<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2024/240227.pdf>

What Next?

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