274 Mail Servers Down as CVE-2026-73570 Fuels Zimbra SNMP Exploitation Wave

Red | Vulnerability
CVE-2026-73570 Zimbra SNMP Command Injection: 274 Mail Servers Compromised | Hive Pro Threat Advisory
Threat Advisory/Vulnerability Report/TA2026289

274 Mail Servers Down as CVE-2026-73570 Fuels Zimbra SNMP Exploitation Wave

CVE-2026-73570, a command injection flaw in Zimbra Collaboration Suite before 10.1.20, lets unauthenticated attackers run commands on servers with SNMP notifications enabled.

CVE-2026-73570Zimbra Collaboration SuiteCVSS 8.9CISA KEVPatch availableCWE-78
Published
October 05, 2026
Admiralty code
A1
TA number
TA2026289
First seen
July 28, 2026
Report type
Vulnerability
CVE
CVE-2026-73570
CVSS v3.1
8.9
Product
Zimbra ZCS
Regions
Worldwide

01 / Overview

Summary

First seen
July 28, 2026
Malware
Chopper, Godzilla Web Shell, CoinMiner, Looptik, Zimdown2, Zimclient2
Affected products
Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) before 10.1.20
Targeted regions
Worldwide

A single malicious email request is enough to give attackers full control of a Zimbra mail server. CVE-2026-73570 is a high-severity command injection flaw in Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions before 10.1.20, and it lets anyone run commands on servers with SNMP notifications turned on, without logging in. A fix came out on July 20, 2026, but attackers began scanning for vulnerable servers within eight days. More than 274 servers were breached and loaded with web shells, cryptominers, and backdoors, and attackers stole emails and credentials along the way. Update to version 10.1.20 right away, and because patching will not remove an attacker who is already inside, also check exposed servers for signs of a breach.


02 / Analysis

Vulnerability Details

#1

CVE-2026-73570 is a high-severity OS command injection vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) versions before 10.1.20. It affects only servers with the optional SNMP monitoring package installed and SNMP notifications enabled, which is not the default setup. An attacker needs no login or user interaction and can exploit the flaw remotely by sending a specially crafted SMTP request to the mail server.

#2

The flaw exists because the server does not properly clean input while processing SNMP notifications. Zimbra's log-monitoring service takes a value from the attacker's request and inserts it directly into a system command used to send SNMP alerts. By adding special shell characters, the attacker breaks out of that command and runs their own commands with the privileges of the Zimbra service account.

#3

After gaining access, attackers installed Chopper and Godzilla web shells, the Zimdown2 installer, the Zimclient2 remote access agent, a CoinMiner cryptominer, and the Looptik privilege escalation toolkit. They raised their privileges, kept long-term access through disguised system services and scheduled tasks, and ran a memory-only agent that takes commands from a blockchain contract. They also stole Zimbra service credentials to reach the mail database and directory, moved to other servers in the cluster, and sent packaged mailbox data to attacker-controlled cloud storage. The attackers have not been identified.

#4

The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 score of 8.9. The non-default configuration requirement lowers the score slightly, but it stays high because exploitation is remote, requires no authentication, and can fully compromise the server. Successful attacks expose email, credentials, and the wider network to espionage, business email compromise, regulatory penalties, and costly incident response. Because attackers set up persistent backdoors, patching alone will not remove an attacker who is already inside.

#5

The fix was released on July 20, 2026. Scanning for vulnerable servers began on July 28, before the flaw was publicly disclosed on August 13, 2026. Active exploitation was reported in mid-August, and the flaw was added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on August 21, 2026, with a remediation deadline of August 24, 2026. At least 274 of more than 12,100 internet-exposed Zimbra servers were found compromised, and about 8,200 were still unpatched. Attacks began after a patch was available, so the flaw is not a zero-day, but it was exploited before most defenders knew about it.

Affected products and CVEs
CVE IDAffected productsAffected CPECWE ID
CVE-2026-73570Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) before 10.1.20cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*CWE-78

03 / Actions

Recommendations

  1. 01
    Upgrade Zimbra Immediately
    Upgrade every Zimbra Collaboration Suite instance to version 10.1.20 or later without delay, following the vendor patch installation guidance. Prioritize internet-facing mail servers and all mailbox, MTA, and proxy nodes in multi-server clusters, since exploitation has been observed at scale and CISA set a three-day remediation deadline for federal agencies.
  2. 02
    Remove or Disable the SNMP Attack Surface
    Where an immediate upgrade is not possible, uninstall the optional zimbra-snmp package or disable SNMP notifications to close the vulnerable code path. Restrict SNMP and SMTP access to trusted hosts at the network perimeter until the upgrade is complete, and re-verify the configuration after any maintenance activity.
  3. 03
    Treat Exposed Servers as Potentially Compromised
    Patching does not remove web shells, backdoors, or persistence that may already be in place. Any server that ran a vulnerable configuration while exposed to the internet should be handled as an incident response case, and reverse-shell or suspicious process alerts on internet-facing mail servers should be escalated as priority incidents.
  4. 04
    Hunt for Web Shells and Malicious Files
    Inspect /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/, /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/, mailboxd webapp directories, the /work/zimbra/jsp/ servlet work directory, and /tmp/ for new or modified .jsp and .jspx files and for files created by the zimbra user within the past 30 days. Review /var/log/zimbra.log for unexpected service restarts and look for masqueraded files such as .kworker_sys, .lpe_core, /usr/sbin/_chronyd, and /dev/shm/systemd-resolved.
  5. 05
    Review Persistence Mechanisms
    Audit /etc/systemd/system/ for unexpected units such as zimlog.service, chronyd-helper.service, and syslog_init.service, and check for unexpected ownership or timestamp changes. Examine /etc/cron.d/, /etc/init.d/, /etc/profile, /etc/bashrc, authorized_keys files, /etc/pam.d/sudo, and /etc/sudoers.d/ for unauthorized modifications, and remove any unauthorized administrator accounts.
  6. 06
    Rotate Zimbra Secrets and Credentials
    Rotate Zimbra authentication secrets, including the service credentials stored in localconfig.xml, LDAP and MySQL passwords, the Zimbra SSH identity used between cluster nodes, and TLS certificates and keys present on the server. Force password resets for user and administrator accounts where mailbox or credential exposure is suspected.

04 / Indicators

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

TypeValue
SHA256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:Port
117[.]107[.]25[.]243[:]7071
192[.]255[.]193[.]111[:]9004
45[.]32[.]30[.]235[:]8081
45[.]32[.]30[.]235[:]8080
193[.]42[.]40[.]135[:]443
3[.]209[.]137[.]175[:]443
Domains
transzimbra[.]linkpc[.]net
tls[.]psk1zim[.]abrdns[.]com
bypass[.]eu[.]org
URLs
psk1zim[.]abrdns[.]com/agentws
wslogzimbra[.]linkpc[.]net/wsstat
mexico-cashpay-test[.]s3[.]dualstack[.]mx-central1[.]amazonaws[.]com/pakistan/2026/aliyun_update[.]tar[.]gz
wsweb03[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net/log/windows[.]log
Filenames
de.sh
agent.sh
agent2.sh
zimdown2
zimclient2
build_amd64
.kworker_sys
.lpe_core
aliyun_update.tar.gz
five.ico
zimlog.service
chronyd-helper.service
syslog_init.service
File Path
/usr/sbin/_chronyd
/dev/shm/systemd-resolved
/etc/systemd/system/zimlog.service
/etc/sudoers.d/81_metric
/opt/zimbra/final.tar.gz
/tmp/zimbra_dump_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS/
/tmp/s
Base Contract Address
0x25bdA7Feb3553995AD68a9A8Ed8c731b73a71586

05 / Mapping

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Reconnaissance
T1595 Active Scanning
T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.004 Unix Shell
Persistence
T1505 Server Software Component
T1505.003 Web Shell
T1543 Create or Modify System Process
T1543.002 Systemd Service
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003 Cron
T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1037.004 RC Scripts
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
T1546.004 Unix Shell Configuration Modification
T1098 Account Manipulation
T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching
Credential Access
T1556 Modify Authentication Process
T1556.003 Pluggable Authentication Modules
T1552 Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001 Credentials In Files
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1620 Reflective Code Loading
T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification
T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
Discovery
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Lateral Movement
T1021 Remote Services
T1021.004 SSH
Collection
T1114 Email Collection
T1114.001 Local Email Collection
T1560 Archive Collected Data
T1560.001 Archive via Utility
T1074 Data Staged
T1074.001 Local Data Staging
Command and Control
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1071 Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001 Web Protocols
T1102 Web Service
T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
Exfiltration
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Impact
T1496 Resource Hijacking
T1496.001 Compute Hijacking

06 / Sources

References & Patch Links

Patch links
References

What Next?

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