Anubis Ransomware Attack Pairs New Lindnor Backdoor with BYOVD Arsenal

Red | Attack
Anubis Ransomware Attack Pairs New Lindnor Backdoor with BYOVD Arsenal | Hive Pro Threat Advisory
Date of publication
November 10, 2026
Admiralty code
A1
TA number
TA2026330
First seen
December 2024
Targeted regions
United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, South Korea, Netherlands, Peru, Italy, New Zealand, China, Switzerland, Austria, Colombia, Poland, Chile
Targeted platform
Windows
Targeted products
Microsoft SQL Server
Targeted industries
Healthcare, Legal, Manufacturing, Business Services & Consulting, Financial Services, Technology, Aerospace and Defense, Energy, Real Estate, Food Service, Transportation, Government, Aviation, Hospitality, Retail, Charitable Organizations, Agriculture, Casino & Gambling, Telecommunications
Threat actor
Hawkmoth (Anubis RaaS operator)
Malware
Anubis ransomware, Lindnor Backdoor

Summary

Anubis ransomware operators breached a U.S. organization in October 2026. Anubis is a ransomware-as-a-service run by Hawkmoth and rebranded from Sphinx in December 2024. The operators installed the previously undocumented Lindnor backdoor, apparently running as a disguised service on two Microsoft SQL Server hosts, where it sent host details to primary and fallback C2 servers over port 443.

Within roughly an hour, they dropped at least 13 security-killing tools and five vulnerable drivers, using the drivers to remove kernel callbacks (BYOVD). They also created a local account and set AnyDesk to keep running in Safe Mode. The encryption payload was blocked before any files were locked. Even so, the ransom note claims data theft, and the payload has an optional wiper mode.


Attack Details

#1

Anubis is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in December 2024 as a rebrand of Sphinx, run by a group tracked as Hawkmoth whose affiliates conduct the intrusions. In October 2026, an Anubis attack on a U.S. organization introduced the previously undocumented Lindnor backdoor. The initial access vector was not determined, and the earliest sign of compromise was Lindnor on the only two Microsoft SQL Server hosts among the affected machines.

#2

Lindnor was installed as healthcontroller64.exe in a directory imitating a Chrome component unpacker on one server and as svchelper.exe in a VMware folder on the other, apparently running as a service in both cases. It reports the process ID, operating system version, its own file path, computer name, user name, domain and logon server to primary and fallback command-and-control servers over port 443. The same backdoor has also surfaced on two unrelated networks without follow-on ransomware.

#3

Within roughly an hour, the operators dropped at least 13 security-killing executables, 11 of them previously unseen, alongside five signed but publicly known vulnerable drivers abused for kernel-level access. Two of these, gbbsym.exe and symgooq.exe, posed as security software and were run to list and remove kernel callbacks through a loaded driver. Only huntreagent.exe and s1.exe escaped blocking, and their identical size but distinct hashes suggest two builds of one tool, possibly used to load the drivers.

#4

To keep access, the operators installed AnyDesk, created a local account added to a local group, and ran safemode.exe, which registered AnyDesk as a service permitted in Safe Mode with Networking, a state in which security software generally does not fully operate. No data theft was confirmed, although the ransom note claims data was downloaded and a July 2026 Anubis intrusion relied on four separate exfiltration tools.

#5

The encryption payload, iservice.exe, was blocked before execution. When successful, it appends the .anubis extension, drops restore files.txt and restore files.html ransom notes, and supports an optional wiper mode that leaves files empty. A bespoke backdoor, an oversized BYOVD toolkit and a Safe Mode fallback mark these operators as prepared to outlast endpoint defenses.


Recommendations

  1. 01

    Block Lindnor and Anubis Indicators

    Add the SHA256 hashes in this advisory to EDR and application control blocklists, and block msrcontrib[.]com and cfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com at DNS, proxy and firewall layers. Review historical DNS and proxy logs for earlier resolutions of either name, since both were observed as network indicators in this intrusion.

  2. 02

    Hunt for Lindnor on Database Servers

    Prioritize Microsoft SQL Server hosts in threat hunts, since both Lindnor implants were found there. Enumerate services whose binaries sit in browser-named or VMware-named folders that do not match the vendor's real install path, and flag executables such as healthcontroller64.exe, svchelper.exe, powerhost.exe, eventwatcher.exe and volumeproxy.exe.

  3. 03

    Enforce Vulnerable Driver Blocking

    Enable the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist together with Memory Integrity (HVCI) or a Windows Defender Application Control driver policy, and add havoc.sys, monprocessex.sys, xhunter1.sys, bdapiutil64.sys and fly.sys to a custom deny rule. Alert on every new kernel driver service created outside approved change windows.

  4. 04

    Harden Endpoint Agents Against Tampering

    Turn on tamper protection for all endpoint security agents, and treat any agent that stops reporting, unloads, or loses its kernel callbacks as a high-severity incident rather than a health alert. A rapid burst of blocked security-tool executables, as seen in this intrusion, should automatically trigger host isolation.

  5. 05

    Monitor SafeBoot Registry Changes

    Alert on any write under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal, and on bcdedit commands that set safeboot options. A new SafeBoot entry for a remote access tool is a strong signal of pre-encryption staging.

  6. 06

    Restrict Remote Access Software

    Maintain an allowlist of sanctioned remote management tools and block unapproved AnyDesk installation and connectivity through application control and egress filtering. Review AnyDesk services and logs on servers where the tool has no business purpose.

  7. 07

    Keep Immutable Offline Backups

    Maintain offline or immutable backups of critical data and test restoration regularly, because the optional Anubis wiper mode empties file contents and paying the ransom cannot restore wiped files.


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeValue
SHA256fc200686175559f4544a5de826905f09a68476d889690a3be40ac32356790cb85d2dd9caf2ae4a5083dbec16e688040456cdbc31eaeecbab78188e322ed0415bad9575a9ef2dcc9d2fd2a24376c418549d4b3db5564c22b20081d33cf7629e43e69b882218fa2a19fd351741874bfcd10a6ae91076e6a8483795e0e357f8d026467d1395b61d4b886329571b564fb21db01639acd2799439646c85b9aeaec17547a864736764112d7897c76e56d51111ce75b3e46fdbac6933df8a5b29507d176543ee9f89d80b2bcf08e98fb8e9e73a4b144a93c7b2a3f28e35de8f7e7a8a8083eff3e51b69968a4ddd503b0b1dccfa8829d638f2dc00cc69640a29aea814f1f8d4142a94269b4258f370ef2292d22a49cd6dee8266a7122f4531e9cc5d9a2fcd1e68583b8b984a9bb5b9f7067077c0e0d8f79da4455c326319e5e5fc6e9c5f5a2082162852984ffe7e7c501faa6cf473129fcba29406ffb98d55198de4b3a55fcd2c954764ac0888c8ba72fc1cf54db64e8f23f83aeb0786ae5b80438ba926aa779d811e00a30dfb56b994bdd63424cbf97617af737a218b6aff9f7c3a50f5854c3e76beb200243ccf6af260e9a2089c2fc545f8f1b34d34c6fe86f2d056c367dee1d52189460b88f8ce5ffa76a5c22f86ffd67f8e689118019fce0863c321cde8dbeaf15250337a03e07a7e257b12b03e5e951885cc69a578545f44425bdd28357d9666a9be36b2ea9ac6007bb8bfbe7e2438e095c1ec40720c4001f47c62588887e709459f1d1a8109b089cb3462c6f796d30b6297a1a0fdb3419a3ccbce962be6983f3ed4f1dc4ce117e135cc0a5ab8fc6b5f5aa0284eff8a9def66e3385abe477517f51d81061d2e69a9adebdcda80d36667d0afabe103fda4802d33db72d0b5615b996cbb01b1ca139e627079094f734da48a0435ffd8480a25d0a258e727d0753d2cd0b2f6eeba4cea53aa10b3ff3ed2afeb78f545fcf6d840f85c3e9058388d05d984ca691a23ee70fcdbd3266c5cdc68ebc5aed95c67f1c502bc75
Filenamehealthcontroller64.exesvchelper.exepowerhost.exeeventwatcher.exevolumeproxy.exeiservice.exeanydesk.exesafemode.exebdr.exehwaudioch.exegibformin.exetest.exexs.scrgibfor.exegbbsym.exesymgooq.exeg.exebackup.exerustr.exehuntreagent.exes1.exehavoc.sysmonprocessex.sysxhunter1.sysbdapiutil64.sysfly.sysrestore files.txtrestore files.html
Domainmsrcontrib[.]com
Hostnamecfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com
Registry KeyHKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AnyDesk
Recent breaches
https://www.cuomollc.comhttps://www.kahlerautomation.comhttps://www.santiamhospital.orghttps://www.newcomerdayton.comhttps://www.fisher59.comhttps://www.leadec-services.comhttps://www.mynd.cohttps://www.gaedke.co.athttps://www.summagold.comhttps://www.betteraccountingsolutions.comhttps://www.gellibrand.org.auhttps://www.marlboroughpartners.comhttps://www.caduceusmedicalgroup.comhttps://www.interimhealthcare.comhttps://www.scholleipn.comhttps://www.cleaverbrooks.comhttps://www.blackburnsmed.comhttps://www.winndixie.com

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Persistence
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1136Create Account
T1136.001Local Account
T1098Account Manipulation
T1098.007Additional Local or Domain Groups
Privilege Escalation
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Stealth
T1036Masquerading
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Defense Impairment
T1685Disable or Modify Tools
T1688Safe Mode Boot
T1112Modify Registry
Discovery
T1082System Information Discovery
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
Command and Control
T1008Fallback Channels
T1219Remote Access Tools
T1219.002Remote Desktop Software
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Impact
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
T1485Data Destruction

References

References

What Next?

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