Summary
Anubis ransomware operators breached a U.S. organization in October 2026. Anubis is a ransomware-as-a-service run by Hawkmoth and rebranded from Sphinx in December 2024. The operators installed the previously undocumented Lindnor backdoor, apparently running as a disguised service on two Microsoft SQL Server hosts, where it sent host details to primary and fallback C2 servers over port 443.
Within roughly an hour, they dropped at least 13 security-killing tools and five vulnerable drivers, using the drivers to remove kernel callbacks (BYOVD). They also created a local account and set AnyDesk to keep running in Safe Mode. The encryption payload was blocked before any files were locked. Even so, the ransom note claims data theft, and the payload has an optional wiper mode.
Attack Details
Anubis is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in December 2024 as a rebrand of Sphinx, run by a group tracked as Hawkmoth whose affiliates conduct the intrusions. In October 2026, an Anubis attack on a U.S. organization introduced the previously undocumented Lindnor backdoor. The initial access vector was not determined, and the earliest sign of compromise was Lindnor on the only two Microsoft SQL Server hosts among the affected machines.
Lindnor was installed as healthcontroller64.exe in a directory imitating a Chrome component unpacker on one server and as svchelper.exe in a VMware folder on the other, apparently running as a service in both cases. It reports the process ID, operating system version, its own file path, computer name, user name, domain and logon server to primary and fallback command-and-control servers over port 443. The same backdoor has also surfaced on two unrelated networks without follow-on ransomware.
Within roughly an hour, the operators dropped at least 13 security-killing executables, 11 of them previously unseen, alongside five signed but publicly known vulnerable drivers abused for kernel-level access. Two of these, gbbsym.exe and symgooq.exe, posed as security software and were run to list and remove kernel callbacks through a loaded driver. Only huntreagent.exe and s1.exe escaped blocking, and their identical size but distinct hashes suggest two builds of one tool, possibly used to load the drivers.
To keep access, the operators installed AnyDesk, created a local account added to a local group, and ran safemode.exe, which registered AnyDesk as a service permitted in Safe Mode with Networking, a state in which security software generally does not fully operate. No data theft was confirmed, although the ransom note claims data was downloaded and a July 2026 Anubis intrusion relied on four separate exfiltration tools.
The encryption payload, iservice.exe, was blocked before execution. When successful, it appends the .anubis extension, drops restore files.txt and restore files.html ransom notes, and supports an optional wiper mode that leaves files empty. A bespoke backdoor, an oversized BYOVD toolkit and a Safe Mode fallback mark these operators as prepared to outlast endpoint defenses.
Recommendations
- 01
Block Lindnor and Anubis Indicators
Add the SHA256 hashes in this advisory to EDR and application control blocklists, and block
msrcontrib[.]comandcfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]comat DNS, proxy and firewall layers. Review historical DNS and proxy logs for earlier resolutions of either name, since both were observed as network indicators in this intrusion. - 02
Hunt for Lindnor on Database Servers
Prioritize Microsoft SQL Server hosts in threat hunts, since both Lindnor implants were found there. Enumerate services whose binaries sit in browser-named or VMware-named folders that do not match the vendor's real install path, and flag executables such as
healthcontroller64.exe,svchelper.exe,powerhost.exe,eventwatcher.exeandvolumeproxy.exe. - 03
Enforce Vulnerable Driver Blocking
Enable the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist together with Memory Integrity (HVCI) or a Windows Defender Application Control driver policy, and add
havoc.sys,monprocessex.sys,xhunter1.sys,bdapiutil64.sysandfly.systo a custom deny rule. Alert on every new kernel driver service created outside approved change windows. - 04
Harden Endpoint Agents Against Tampering
Turn on tamper protection for all endpoint security agents, and treat any agent that stops reporting, unloads, or loses its kernel callbacks as a high-severity incident rather than a health alert. A rapid burst of blocked security-tool executables, as seen in this intrusion, should automatically trigger host isolation.
- 05
Monitor SafeBoot Registry Changes
Alert on any write under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\NetworkorHKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal, and onbcdeditcommands that set safeboot options. A new SafeBoot entry for a remote access tool is a strong signal of pre-encryption staging. - 06
Restrict Remote Access Software
Maintain an allowlist of sanctioned remote management tools and block unapproved AnyDesk installation and connectivity through application control and egress filtering. Review AnyDesk services and logs on servers where the tool has no business purpose.
- 07
Keep Immutable Offline Backups
Maintain offline or immutable backups of critical data and test restoration regularly, because the optional Anubis wiper mode empties file contents and paying the ransom cannot restore wiped files.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA256 | 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 |
| Filename | healthcontroller64.exesvchelper.exepowerhost.exeeventwatcher.exevolumeproxy.exeiservice.exeanydesk.exesafemode.exebdr.exehwaudioch.exegibformin.exetest.exexs.scrgibfor.exegbbsym.exesymgooq.exeg.exebackup.exerustr.exehuntreagent.exes1.exehavoc.sysmonprocessex.sysxhunter1.sysbdapiutil64.sysfly.sysrestore files.txtrestore files.html |
| Domain | msrcontrib[.]com |
| Hostname | cfgsync-relay[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com |
| Registry Key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AnyDesk |
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Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.003Windows ServiceT1136Create AccountT1136.001Local AccountT1098Account ManipulationT1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsT1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1036MasqueradingT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationT1685Disable or Modify ToolsT1688Safe Mode BootT1112Modify RegistryT1082System Information DiscoveryT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryT1008Fallback ChannelsT1219Remote Access ToolsT1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareT1105Ingress Tool TransferT1486Data Encrypted for ImpactT1485Data DestructionReferences
References
What Next?
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