ClingSTUN Backdoor Turns Exposed IoT Devices into Stealthy Proxy Nodes

Red | Attack
ClingSTUN Backdoor Turns Exposed IoT Devices into Stealthy Proxy Nodes | Hive Pro Threat Advisory
Threat Advisory/Attack Report/TA2026295

ClingSTUN Backdoor Turns Exposed IoT Devices into Stealthy Proxy Nodes

ClingSTUN exploits 24 known vulnerabilities in Internet-facing IoT and edge devices and uses legitimate public STUN servers, not a dedicated C2 server, to run back-connect proxy nodes.

ClingSTUN BackdoorIoT and edge devices24 exploited CVEsSTUN abuseLinuxWorldwide
Published
October 09, 2026
Admiralty code
A1
TA number
TA2026295
Report type
Attack
Malware
ClingSTUN Backdoor
Platform
Linux (IoT)
Initial-access CVEs
24
Hard-coded CVEs
7
Regions
Worldwide

01 / Overview

Summary

Targeted regions
Worldwide
Targeted platforms
Linux (IoT and embedded devices on ARM, Intel 80386, AMD x86-64, MIPS R3000 and PowerPC architectures)
Targeted products
AVTECH, China Mobile, D-Link, EnGenius, Hytec Inter, Ivanti, KGUARD, Lantronix, LB-LINK, Linear, Linksys, MeiG Smart, MVPower, Realtek, Sunhillo, TBK, Tenda and TP-Link routers, NAS, DVR/CCTV, IP camera, access control and edge gateway devices
Malware
ClingSTUN Backdoor

ClingSTUN is a multi-architecture Linux backdoor that compromises Internet-facing IoT and edge devices by exploiting 24 known vulnerabilities, then spreads on its own using seven more hardcoded exploits. Once installed, it hides itself, persists through init scripts, kills competing malware, and abuses legitimate public STUN servers to learn its external IP and port mappings, turning hijacked devices into back-connect proxy nodes that can also run attacker commands without any dedicated C2 server.


02 / Analysis

Attack Details

#1

ClingSTUN is a Linux backdoor built to take over Internet-facing IoT and edge devices, and it runs on all common device architectures. It gets in through 24 known vulnerabilities in products from Hytec Inter, EnGenius, D-Link, Realtek, TP-Link, AVTECH, Linear eMerge, Sunhillo, Ivanti, Tenda, MeiG Smart and Lantronix. Most of these flaws let an attacker inject commands into a device's web or UPnP interface without logging in. In one observed attack, the operator exploited CVE-2022-36553 in a Hytec Inter router to deliver a downloader. The downloader then fetched ClingSTUN builds for the device's architecture.

#2

Newer versions of the downloader prepare the device before ClingSTUN starts. They unmount selected file systems, kill processes running from temporary storage and disable the hardware watchdog, so the device cannot reboot itself and clear the infection. Once active, ClingSTUN checks the running processes and kills any that look like competing malware, which removes rival botnets from the device. To survive reboots, ClingSTUN saves hidden copies of itself and adds itself to the device's startup scripts. It also hides from process listings by showing the details of a legitimate system process in place of its own and by blanking its command line.

#3

ClingSTUN has no dedicated command-and-control server. It uses legitimate public STUN servers, which normally help VoIP and video-call apps work through NAT, to learn the device's external IP address and open ports. It then regularly reports its group ID and port details back to those same servers. Because this traffic looks like ordinary VoIP or WebRTC activity, it blends into normal network noise.

#4

The infected device then works as a proxy node. The operator can route traffic through victim IP addresses, including corporate ones, which hides where an attack really comes from and can get the victim's addresses blocklisted. A special control packet can also tell the backdoor to connect out to an attacker-chosen server, download a command and run it. ClingSTUN spreads by itself using built-in exploits for seven more vulnerabilities in Realtek, MVPower, TBK, Linksys, LB-LINK, China Mobile and KGUARD devices.

Exploited CVEs (24 initial access, 7 hard-coded for self-spreading)
CVENameAffected productNote
CVE-2022-36553Hytec Inter HWL-2511-SS Command InjectionHytec Inter HWL-2511-SSInitial access
CVE-2025-34035EnGenius EnShare Cloud Service OS Command InjectionEnGenius EnShare Cloud ServiceInitial access
CVE-2024-23625D-Link UPnP SUBSCRIBE Code InjectionD-Link DevicesInitial access
CVE-2021-35394Realtek Jungle SDK Remote Code ExecutionRealtek Jungle SDKInitial access
CVE-2023-1389TP-Link Archer AX21 Command InjectionTP-Link Archer AX21Initial access · CISA KEV
CVE-2024-7029AVTECH AVM1203 Command InjectionAVTECH AVM1203Initial access
CVE-2024-10915D-Link Command InjectionD-Link DevicesInitial access
CVE-2024-23624D-Link DAP-1650 Command InjectionD-Link DAP-1650Initial access
CVE-2019-17621D-Link DIR-859 Router Command ExecutionD-Link DIR-859 RouterInitial access
CVE-2019-7256Nice Linear eMerge E3-Series OS Command InjectionNice Linear eMerge E3-SeriesInitial access · CISA KEV
CVE-2021-36380Sunhillo SureLine OS Command InjectionSunhillo SureLineInitial access
CVE-2024-21887Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Command InjectionIvanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureInitial access · CISA KEV
CVE-2023-46805Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Authentication BypassIvanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureInitial access · CISA KEV
CVE-2024-46048Tenda exeCommand Command InjectionTenda DevicesInitial access
CVE-2024-35340Tenda exeCommand Command InjectionTenda DevicesInitial access
CVE-2024-32314Tenda AC500 formexeCommand Command InjectionTenda AC500Initial access
CVE-2024-32292Tenda exeCommand Command InjectionTenda DevicesInitial access
CVE-2024-32281Tenda exeCommand Command InjectionTenda DevicesInitial access
CVE-2022-35555Tenda W6 exeCommand Command InjectionTenda W6Initial access
CVE-2022-26289Tenda exeCommand Command InjectionTenda DevicesInitial access
CVE-2022-37055D-Link Routers Buffer OverflowD-Link RoutersInitial access · CISA KEV
CVE-2024-10914D-Link NAS Command InjectionD-Link NAS devicesInitial access
CVE-2026-36356MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 GoAhead Command InjectionMeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711Initial access
CVE-2025-67038Lantronix EDS5000 Code InjectionLantronix EDS5000Initial access
CVE-2014-8361Realtek SDK Improper Input ValidationRealtek SDKHard-coded exploit
CVE-2016-20016MVPower Remote Command ExecutionMVPower tv-7104he_firmwareHard-coded exploit
CVE-2024-3721TBK DVR OS Command InjectionTBK DVR-4104 / DVR-4216Hard-coded exploit
CVE-2025-34037Linksys E-Series Routers OS Command InjectionLinksys E-Series RoutersHard-coded exploit
CVE-2023-26801LB-LINK Command Injectionlb-link bllte300_firmwareHard-coded exploit
CVE-2023-41011China Mobile Intelligent Home Gateway Command ExecutionChina Mobile HG6543C4Hard-coded exploit
CVE-2026-87827KGUARD DVR Command ExecutionKGUARD DVRHard-coded exploit

03 / Actions

Recommendations

  1. 01
    Patch or Retire Exposed Edge Devices
    Inventory every Internet-facing router, NAS, DVR, IP camera, access controller and VPN gateway from the affected vendors and apply the latest vendor firmware for the CVEs listed in this advisory. Devices that are end-of-life or will not be fixed, such as the affected D-Link DNS-series NAS models, should be isolated or replaced.
  2. 02
    Prioritise CISA KEV-Listed Flaws
    Treat CVE-2023-1389 (TP-Link Archer AX21), CVE-2019-7256 (Nice Linear eMerge E3), CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2023-46805 (Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure) and CVE-2022-37055 (D-Link Go-RT-AC750) as top priority, since they are confirmed as exploited in the wild.
  3. 03
    Monitor for Unexpected STUN Traffic
    Alert on STUN binding requests (typically UDP 3478 and related ports) from devices that have no reason to use VoIP or WebRTC, such as routers, NAS and DVRs, and on recurring keepalive-style UDP traffic to many public STUN endpoints.
  4. 04
    Hunt for ClingSTUN Persistence Artifacts
    On Linux-based devices you can access, check for /root/.cling and /usr/local/bin/.cling, unexpected entries in /etc/inittab, /etc/init.d/rcS and /etc/rc.d/rc.boot, bind mounts over /proc/PID paths, disabled watchdog timers, and executables running from /tmp.
  5. 05
    Reflash Compromised Devices
    Because ClingSTUN hides from process listings and persists through boot scripts, reflash any device suspected of compromise with clean vendor firmware and reset its credentials instead of attempting manual cleanup.
  6. 06
    Track Device Firmware Lifecycle
    Keep an accurate asset register with firmware versions and vendor support status, and add vendor security bulletins for these product lines to routine vulnerability management reviews.

04 / Indicators

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

TypeValue
SHA256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124[.]163[.]212[.]119
222[.]223[.]152[.]97
118[.]145[.]196[.]225
File Path
/root/.cling
/usr/local/bin/.cling

05 / Mapping

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Resource Development
T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
T1584.008 Network Devices
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.004 Unix Shell
Persistence
T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1037.004 RC Scripts
Defense Evasion
T1564 Hide Artifacts
T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
T1564.013 Bind Mounts
T1036 Masquerading
T1562 Impair Defenses
T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery
Lateral Movement
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Command and Control
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1090 Proxy
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1205 Traffic Signaling
T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Impact
T1489 Service Stop

06 / Sources

References & Patch Links

Patch links
References

What Next?

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