GigaWiper: The All-in-One Destruction Kit

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GigaWiper: The All-in-One Destruction Kit | TA2026197 | Hive Pro Threat Advisory

Threat Advisory · Attack Report

GigaWiper: The All-in-One Destruction Kit

A Go-based Windows backdoor known as GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT) folds destructive wiper routines, ransomware-style file encryption, and a full remote-control toolkit into a single implant — letting operators shift from quiet surveillance to irreversible sabotage on demand.

TA Number: TA2026197 Admiralty Code: A1 Classification: Amber Malware: GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT) Date of Publication: July 13, 2026
First Seen
October 2025
Targeted Regions
Worldwide
Targeted Platform
Windows
Targeted Product
Microsoft Windows
Malware
GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT)
Malware Type
Backdoor / Wiper / Ransomware
TA Number
TA2026197
Admiralty Code
A1
Date of Publication
July 13, 2026

Summary

GigaWiper is a Go-based backdoor that packs several destructive tools into a single implant. Researchers first spotted it wiping compromised Windows environments in October 2025, with the malware family targeting organizations worldwide. Instead of being one purpose-built tool, GigaWiper stitches together code from at least three older malware families and exposes them as on-demand commands to the operator.

Operators using GigaWiper can quietly gather intelligence on a compromised Microsoft Windows host, then flip to destruction on command — overwriting physical disks, encrypting files with keys that are never saved (a fake ransomware routine with no recovery path), or forcing an unbootable Blue Screen of Death. The GigaWiper implant maintains persistence, communicates over RabbitMQ and Redis, and offers a broad remote-control toolkit that gives attackers hands-on control of infected systems before the destructive payload is triggered.


Attack Details

Dual-Form Go Implant

GigaWiper, also tracked as BLUERABBIT, is a newly identified Windows threat built to do more than steal information or lock a screen. It is a Go-based implant that pairs a full command-and-control backdoor with several built-in destruction routines, and it appears in two closely related forms: standalone wiper binaries and a larger backdoor. Both are unstripped Go portable executables, and the standalone wiper's code is embedded wholesale inside the backdoor as one of its on-demand commands, letting an operator move from a quiet presence to irreversible damage whenever they choose.

Persistence and Command-and-Control Communication

Once running, GigaWiper establishes persistence by creating a registry key at HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment that tracks how many times it has executed. On first run it creates a scheduled task named OneDrive Update set to fire every minute and again at system startup, then exits; on later runs it recognizes it is executing as that task and continues. It decrypts a hard-coded configuration using AES with a hard-coded key to recover its command-and-control details, then receives operator commands over RabbitMQ (AMQP) and reports status and output back through a Redis server. Its commands are numbered 1 through 20 and span destruction, surveillance, and system management, with a fanout exchange named All broadcasting a command to every infected host at once and a topic exchange named Topic letting operators target specific machines.

Remote-Control Toolkit

Beyond persistence and communication, the GigaWiper backdoor gives operators a broad remote-control toolkit. Command 20 stands up a VNC-style server with keyboard, mouse, and live screen streaming over a chosen TCP port, disguising the firewall rules it needs with names borrowed from legitimate Windows components. Interactive managers for processes (command 16), services (command 17), and the registry (command 18, which keeps session state between requests like an interactive browser) provide hands-on control of a compromised host.

Data Collection and Exfiltration

For data handling, command 4 uses the MinIO Client to upload files to remote S3-compatible storage, while command 15 gathers extensive system information such as IP address, machine GUID, CPU, OS, network configuration, firmware, user details, and installed antivirus products, and returns it through the C2 channel. Screenshots (command 9) and continuous screen recording while the user is active (command 10) round out its collection capability.

Destruction Routines

The operation ends in destruction: command 1 overwrites raw disk content and removes partition metadata before rebooting, command 12 performs a multi-pass secure wipe of the Windows drive, command 3 encrypts files with an unsaved key and renames them with a .candy extension while dropping a threatening wallpaper, and command 2 disables recovery and deletes boot and kernel files to leave the machine unbootable. Command 19 then clears Windows event logs to frustrate incident response.

A Consolidated Destruction Platform

Taken together, these capabilities make GigaWiper less a single tool than a destruction platform: at least three previously separate malware families are folded into one backdoor that can switch from quiet surveillance to irreversible sabotage on demand, all while masquerading as routine OneDrive activity on the compromised Windows platform.


Recommendations

01

Enable Tamper Protection Tenant-Wide

Turn on tamper protection so attackers cannot disable security services or add antivirus exclusions before deploying destructive GigaWiper commands. Where supported, enable DisableLocalAdminMerge to stop local modification of exclusions via GPO.

02

Block the Known C2 Infrastructure

Block outbound access to the reported command-and-control addresses (185.182.193[.]21 and 212.8.248[.]104), including the RabbitMQ and Redis service ports observed in samples, and feed these indicators into perimeter and DNS controls.

03

Hunt for the Persistence Artifacts

Search for the scheduled task named OneDrive Update that runs every minute, and for the registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment. Both impersonate legitimate OneDrive naming and are strong signals of a GigaWiper foothold.

04

Isolate and Preserve Suspected Hosts Immediately

Treat a suspected GigaWiper infection as a business-continuity emergency, not routine malware cleanup. Isolate affected devices from the network to cut them off from broadcast C2 commands, and preserve forensic evidence before destructive commands can spread.

05

Maintain Tested Offline Backups

Keep offline or otherwise protected backups, since a disk wiper can destroy the operating system and any data stored beside it. Rehearse recovery under realistic failure conditions, including unbootable systems and unavailable network services.

06

Monitor Scheduled Tasks and Registry Changes

Continuously monitor for new scheduled tasks and registry modifications that masquerade as trusted software, and for firewall rules created under names that mimic legitimate Windows components.


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeValue
SHA256633d4cbd496b1094495da89a64f5e6c31a0f6d4d1488411db5b0cba1cfe42001
SHA256ce9ad5f6c12019f4aae5b189bd8ddf5bb09e75b06a0a587b25a855c65948c913
SHA256f622ed85ef31ad4ab973f4e74524866fe1bb44f0965ad2b2ad796cd657a05bfd
SHA2569706a192e2c1a1faaf0a521daf31c2af60ff4590e3f47bbb4abc227f42af0683
SHA2563c30deb6556a94cfb84ae51798f4aecfae8c7358e55fdb321c5f2376579631cd
SHA256440b5385d3838e3f6bc21220caa83b65cd5f3618daea676f271c3671650ce9a3
SHA25612c39f052f030a77c0cd531df86ad3477f46d1287b8b98b625d1dcf89385d721
SHA256db41e0da7ab3305be8d9720769c6950b4dc1c1984ef857d3310eb873a0fc7674
IPv4185[.]182[.]193[.]21
IPv4212[.]8[.]248[.]104
IPv4:Port185[.]182[.]193[.]21[:]5544
IPv4:Port185[.]182[.]193[.]21[:]7542

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

TacticTechniqueSub-technique
ExecutionT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001: PowerShell
PersistenceT1053: Scheduled Task/JobT1053.005: Scheduled Task
Defense EvasionT1036: MasqueradingT1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Defense EvasionT1070: Indicator RemovalT1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs
Defense EvasionT1112: Modify Registry
Defense EvasionT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Defense EvasionT1562: Impair DefensesT1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall
DiscoveryT1082: System Information Discovery
DiscoveryT1518: Software DiscoveryT1518.001: Security Software Discovery
CollectionT1113: Screen Capture
Command and ControlT1071: Application Layer Protocol
Command and ControlT1219: Remote Access Software
ExfiltrationT1567: Exfiltration Over Web ServiceT1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
ImpactT1485: Data Destruction
ImpactT1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
ImpactT1561: Disk WipeT1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe; T1561.001: Disk Content Wipe
ImpactT1490: Inhibit System Recovery
ImpactT1529: System Shutdown/Reboot

References


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