Threat Advisory · Attack Report
GigaWiper: The All-in-One Destruction Kit
A Go-based Windows backdoor known as GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT) folds destructive wiper routines, ransomware-style file encryption, and a full remote-control toolkit into a single implant — letting operators shift from quiet surveillance to irreversible sabotage on demand.
TA2026197 Admiralty Code: A1 Classification: Amber Malware: GigaWiper (aka BLUERABBIT) Date of Publication: July 13, 2026 TA2026197A1Section 01
Summary
GigaWiper is a Go-based backdoor that packs several destructive tools into a single implant. Researchers first spotted it wiping compromised Windows environments in October 2025, with the malware family targeting organizations worldwide. Instead of being one purpose-built tool, GigaWiper stitches together code from at least three older malware families and exposes them as on-demand commands to the operator.
Operators using GigaWiper can quietly gather intelligence on a compromised Microsoft Windows host, then flip to destruction on command — overwriting physical disks, encrypting files with keys that are never saved (a fake ransomware routine with no recovery path), or forcing an unbootable Blue Screen of Death. The GigaWiper implant maintains persistence, communicates over RabbitMQ and Redis, and offers a broad remote-control toolkit that gives attackers hands-on control of infected systems before the destructive payload is triggered.
Section 02
Attack Details
Dual-Form Go Implant
GigaWiper, also tracked as BLUERABBIT, is a newly identified Windows threat built to do more than steal information or lock a screen. It is a Go-based implant that pairs a full command-and-control backdoor with several built-in destruction routines, and it appears in two closely related forms: standalone wiper binaries and a larger backdoor. Both are unstripped Go portable executables, and the standalone wiper's code is embedded wholesale inside the backdoor as one of its on-demand commands, letting an operator move from a quiet presence to irreversible damage whenever they choose.
Persistence and Command-and-Control Communication
Once running, GigaWiper establishes persistence by creating a registry key at HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment that tracks how many times it has executed. On first run it creates a scheduled task named OneDrive Update set to fire every minute and again at system startup, then exits; on later runs it recognizes it is executing as that task and continues. It decrypts a hard-coded configuration using AES with a hard-coded key to recover its command-and-control details, then receives operator commands over RabbitMQ (AMQP) and reports status and output back through a Redis server. Its commands are numbered 1 through 20 and span destruction, surveillance, and system management, with a fanout exchange named All broadcasting a command to every infected host at once and a topic exchange named Topic letting operators target specific machines.
Remote-Control Toolkit
Beyond persistence and communication, the GigaWiper backdoor gives operators a broad remote-control toolkit. Command 20 stands up a VNC-style server with keyboard, mouse, and live screen streaming over a chosen TCP port, disguising the firewall rules it needs with names borrowed from legitimate Windows components. Interactive managers for processes (command 16), services (command 17), and the registry (command 18, which keeps session state between requests like an interactive browser) provide hands-on control of a compromised host.
Data Collection and Exfiltration
For data handling, command 4 uses the MinIO Client to upload files to remote S3-compatible storage, while command 15 gathers extensive system information such as IP address, machine GUID, CPU, OS, network configuration, firmware, user details, and installed antivirus products, and returns it through the C2 channel. Screenshots (command 9) and continuous screen recording while the user is active (command 10) round out its collection capability.
Destruction Routines
The operation ends in destruction: command 1 overwrites raw disk content and removes partition metadata before rebooting, command 12 performs a multi-pass secure wipe of the Windows drive, command 3 encrypts files with an unsaved key and renames them with a .candy extension while dropping a threatening wallpaper, and command 2 disables recovery and deletes boot and kernel files to leave the machine unbootable. Command 19 then clears Windows event logs to frustrate incident response.
A Consolidated Destruction Platform
Taken together, these capabilities make GigaWiper less a single tool than a destruction platform: at least three previously separate malware families are folded into one backdoor that can switch from quiet surveillance to irreversible sabotage on demand, all while masquerading as routine OneDrive activity on the compromised Windows platform.
Section 03
Recommendations
01Enable Tamper Protection Tenant-Wide
Turn on tamper protection so attackers cannot disable security services or add antivirus exclusions before deploying destructive GigaWiper commands. Where supported, enable DisableLocalAdminMerge to stop local modification of exclusions via GPO.
02Block the Known C2 Infrastructure
Block outbound access to the reported command-and-control addresses (185.182.193[.]21 and 212.8.248[.]104), including the RabbitMQ and Redis service ports observed in samples, and feed these indicators into perimeter and DNS controls.
03Hunt for the Persistence Artifacts
Search for the scheduled task named OneDrive Update that runs every minute, and for the registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\OneDrive\Environment. Both impersonate legitimate OneDrive naming and are strong signals of a GigaWiper foothold.
04Isolate and Preserve Suspected Hosts Immediately
Treat a suspected GigaWiper infection as a business-continuity emergency, not routine malware cleanup. Isolate affected devices from the network to cut them off from broadcast C2 commands, and preserve forensic evidence before destructive commands can spread.
05Maintain Tested Offline Backups
Keep offline or otherwise protected backups, since a disk wiper can destroy the operating system and any data stored beside it. Rehearse recovery under realistic failure conditions, including unbootable systems and unavailable network services.
06Monitor Scheduled Tasks and Registry Changes
Continuously monitor for new scheduled tasks and registry modifications that masquerade as trusted software, and for firewall rules created under names that mimic legitimate Windows components.
Section 04
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA256 | 633d4cbd496b1094495da89a64f5e6c31a0f6d4d1488411db5b0cba1cfe42001 |
| SHA256 | ce9ad5f6c12019f4aae5b189bd8ddf5bb09e75b06a0a587b25a855c65948c913 |
| SHA256 | f622ed85ef31ad4ab973f4e74524866fe1bb44f0965ad2b2ad796cd657a05bfd |
| SHA256 | 9706a192e2c1a1faaf0a521daf31c2af60ff4590e3f47bbb4abc227f42af0683 |
| SHA256 | 3c30deb6556a94cfb84ae51798f4aecfae8c7358e55fdb321c5f2376579631cd |
| SHA256 | 440b5385d3838e3f6bc21220caa83b65cd5f3618daea676f271c3671650ce9a3 |
| SHA256 | 12c39f052f030a77c0cd531df86ad3477f46d1287b8b98b625d1dcf89385d721 |
| SHA256 | db41e0da7ab3305be8d9720769c6950b4dc1c1984ef857d3310eb873a0fc7674 |
| IPv4 | 185[.]182[.]193[.]21 |
| IPv4 | 212[.]8[.]248[.]104 |
| IPv4:Port | 185[.]182[.]193[.]21[:]5544 |
| IPv4:Port | 185[.]182[.]193[.]21[:]7542 |
Section 05
Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
| Tactic | Technique | Sub-technique |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059.001: PowerShell |
| Persistence | T1053: Scheduled Task/Job | T1053.005: Scheduled Task |
| Defense Evasion | T1036: Masquerading | T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
| Defense Evasion | T1070: Indicator Removal | T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs |
| Defense Evasion | T1112: Modify Registry | — |
| Defense Evasion | T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | — |
| Defense Evasion | T1562: Impair Defenses | T1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
| Discovery | T1082: System Information Discovery | — |
| Discovery | T1518: Software Discovery | T1518.001: Security Software Discovery |
| Collection | T1113: Screen Capture | — |
| Command and Control | T1071: Application Layer Protocol | — |
| Command and Control | T1219: Remote Access Software | — |
| Exfiltration | T1567: Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
| Impact | T1485: Data Destruction | — |
| Impact | T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact | — |
| Impact | T1561: Disk Wipe | T1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe; T1561.001: Disk Content Wipe |
| Impact | T1490: Inhibit System Recovery | — |
| Impact | T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot | — |
Section 06
References
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/09/gigawiper-anatomy-of-a-destructive-backdoor-assembled-from-multiple-malware/
- https://binarydefense.com/resources/blog/bluerabbit-a-golang-based-backdoor-with-ransomware-and-destructive-capabilities
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