HOLLOWGRAPH Hides Its C2 in Microsoft 365 Calendars

Amber | Attack
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HOLLOWGRAPH Hides Its C2 in Microsoft 365 Calendars | TA2026207 | HivePro Threat Advisory

Threat Advisory • Attack Report • TLP: Amber

HOLLOWGRAPH Hides Its C2 in Microsoft 365 Calendars

HOLLOWGRAPH is a .NET espionage implant that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox calendar into a covert two-way command-and-control channel, using the trusted Microsoft Graph API to plant tasking and exfiltrate stolen files as encrypted, far-future calendar events.

Malware: HOLLOWGRAPH Espionage Cavern Backdoor Framework TLP: Amber Admiralty Code: A1 TA2026207
First Seen
June 3, 2026
Targeted Region
Israel
Targeted Platform
Windows
Targeted Products
Microsoft 365, Graph API, Entra ID
Malware
HOLLOWGRAPH
Attack Type
Espionage / Cloud C2
Admiralty Code
A1
Date of Publication
July 22, 2026
TA Number
TA2026207

Summary

HOLLOWGRAPH is a .NET espionage implant, first seen on June 3, 2026, that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox calendar into a covert two-way command-and-control channel. Working through the trusted Microsoft Graph API, HOLLOWGRAPH operators plant tasking as calendar events, and the implant exfiltrates stolen files as encrypted attachments on events it creates, all dated far into the future (May 13, 2050) so the mailbox owner never notices them.

HOLLOWGRAPH payloads are protected with hybrid RSA and AES-256 encryption, using separate key pairs for incoming and outgoing traffic. A second channel uses DNS tunneling over IPv6 AAAA records to the attacker domain cloudlanecdn[.]com to refresh the Entra ID credentials the malware authenticates with. At least 12 infected systems tied to the HOLLOWGRAPH campaign are identified, roughly three actively communicating during analysis, with all evidence pointing to a narrow, targeted focus on Israeli entities.


Attack Details

#1 Hiding in Plain Sight Inside Microsoft's Own Cloud

HOLLOWGRAPH is espionage malware that stands out less for what it steals and more for where it hides. Instead of talking to a server the attacker owns, it borrows Microsoft's own cloud: every command it receives and every file it steals moves through normal-looking Microsoft 365 traffic, which makes the HOLLOWGRAPH activity extremely hard to separate from an organization's everyday cloud usage. Group-IB links the implant with high confidence to the modular Cavern backdoor framework, a toolset previously tied to Iranian-nexus activity.

#2 Operating Through an Already Compromised Microsoft 365 Account

The HOLLOWGRAPH malware does not need to break in on its own. It operates through an already compromised Microsoft 365 account belonging to an Israeli organization, using stored Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) credentials, tenant ID, client ID, client secret, and the target mailbox to authenticate with the Microsoft Graph API. How that account and the affected hosts were first compromised is not detailed in the available reporting.

#3 A NativeAOT-Compiled DLL Blending in With Log Files

Technically, HOLLOWGRAPH is a .NET NativeAOT-compiled DLL that a loader runs with a structured command string. It supports only two actions, "get" and "send," and both run entirely through the Graph API. On execution, HOLLOWGRAPH writes its hardcoded configuration to disk as logAzure.txt, a filename chosen to blend in with ordinary log files.

#4 A Shared Calendar as a Covert Drop Box

The clever part is the calendar. The compromised mailbox's calendar acts as a shared drop box. To pick up orders, HOLLOWGRAPH runs the "get" command, searching for an operator-planted event scheduled for May 13, 2050, and titled "Event ID: <task ID>," then downloads and decrypts the attached instructions with its private RSA key. To steal data, the "send" command reverses the flow: it encrypts the target file, creates its own far-future 2050 event, uploads the data as one or more "File{n}.txt" attachments, and renames the event to an operator-recognizable "Boss{..}ID{..}" tag. All of this is secured with hybrid RSA-OAEP plus AES-256-GCM, using distinct key pairs so that tasking and exfiltration remain cryptographically separate.

#5 A Separate DNS Channel Keeps Access Alive

Because both tasking and exfiltration ride the same trusted Graph channel, the stolen data leaves the environment disguised as routine Microsoft 365 calendar activity rather than as recognizable outbound C2. A separate, unencrypted DNS channel keeps that access alive: HOLLOWGRAPH issues AAAA (IPv6) queries to cloudlanecdn[.]com, decodes the credential values from the returned IPv6 addresses in 14-byte chunks, and rewrites the refreshed values back into logAzure.txt. Notably, there is no Microsoft vulnerability and no patch involved here — HOLLOWGRAPH abuses a compromised account and the Graph API's legitimate functionality, which is exactly what makes it stealthy.


Recommendations

01

Hunt for HOLLOWGRAPH and Cavern Indicators

Proactively search for the C2 domain cloudlanecdn[.]com, the on-disk configuration file logAzure.txt, and the known file hashes across your environment to identify existing HOLLOWGRAPH infections.

02

Inspect Suspicious Calendar Artifacts

Hunt Microsoft 365 calendars for events with the tell-tale traits of this malware: a far-future date of May 13, 2050, a bare GUID as the subject, subjects matching "Event ID:" or "Boss{..}ID{..}", and attachments named "File{n}.txt."

03

Monitor Graph API and Mailbox Audit Logs

Review Microsoft Graph and mailbox audit activity for application-driven calendar changes, such as events created, attachments uploaded, or subjects renamed by an application rather than a human user.

04

Lock Down Client-Credential OAuth Applications

Restrict, monitor, and audit client-credentials OAuth2 applications that can reach Graph, and alert on the creation of new client secrets or credentials that could be abused for silent cloud access.

05

Enforce Entra ID Identity Hygiene

Apply Conditional Access policies, rotate credentials regularly, and enable anomalous-token detection across Microsoft 365 and Entra ID to limit what a stolen set of application credentials can do.


Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

T1078.004
Initial Access
T1078: Valid Accounts — Cloud Accounts
T1129
Execution
Shared Modules
T1036.005
Defense Evasion
T1036: Masquerading — Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1102.002
Command and Control
T1102: Web Service — Bidirectional Communication
T1071.004
Command and Control
T1071: Application Layer Protocol — DNS
T1572
Command and Control
Protocol Tunneling
T1573.002
Command and Control
T1573: Encrypted Channel — Asymmetric Cryptography
T1005
Collection
Data from Local System
T1041
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeValue
Domaincloudlanecdn[.]com
SHA25675e51774b8f79e5f256eaae639635f911b3e744d4774fd6068dd980255621509
SHA256f3f3006f8304788251b153d53b305322b8acab0c66ec816b8d9f101bcc851da3
SHA256b3d0f6e4e3be395fd7cf9e8101c89963d77216578cbb117a6ac9bc3564485eff

References


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