LabubaRAT: A Rust-Based Remote Access Framework

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LabubaRAT: A Rust-Based Remote Access Framework | TA2026200 | HivePro Threat Advisory
Threat Advisory • Attack Report

LabubaRAT: A Rust-Based Remote Access Framework

LabubaRAT is a newly identified Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) that masquerades as NVIDIA software to compromise Windows systems worldwide. Built as a reusable Malware-as-a-Service framework, LabubaRAT accepts flexible command-and-control configuration at runtime, profiles security tools and browsers on infected hosts, and gives operators broad remote access capabilities.

TLP: Amber Admiralty Code: A1 Malware: LabubaRAT Platform: Windows (64-bit) Region: Worldwide
TA Number
TA2026200
Date of Publication
July 16, 2026
Admiralty Code
A1
First Seen
June 2026
Malware
LabubaRAT
Targeted Region
Worldwide
Targeted Platform
Windows (64-bit)
Impersonated Product
NVIDIA Container Runtime Toolkit
Classification
Amber

Summary

Overview

LabubaRAT was first seen in June 2026 and has since been observed targeting Windows (64-bit) systems worldwide. The malware disguises itself as NVIDIA software, specifically impersonating the NVIDIA Container Runtime Toolkit, to infect Windows computers while evading casual inspection.

Once installed, LabubaRAT inventories the browsers present on the infected host, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, and Brave. It also profiles installed endpoint security products, checking for Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, Sophos, Malwarebytes, Bitdefender, ESET, Kaspersky, McAfee, Symantec, and Trend Micro.

Unlike traditional remote access trojans that hardcode their command-and-control server, LabubaRAT accepts configuration at startup, allowing attackers to reuse the same malware binary across multiple targets and campaigns. The malware profiles infected computers to identify security tools and browsers before awaiting operator commands, indicating LabubaRAT was purpose-built as a reusable remote access framework designed for Malware-as-a-Service deployments.


Attack Details

#1 — Masquerading and Persistence

LabubaRAT is a new Rust-based remote access trojan designed for Windows systems. The malware disguises itself as NVIDIA software by using a fake executable named nvidia-sysruntime.exe, complete with fabricated NVIDIA metadata and a legitimate-looking debug path. Instead of relying on a hardcoded command-and-control server, it accepts configuration details through command-line arguments or environment variables at startup. Once installed, LabubaRAT stores its settings in a local SQLite database. It achieves persistence by adding itself to the Windows startup registry, typically using encoded configuration strings to keep the command line less conspicuous.

#2 — Flexible Configuration and Host Profiling

LabubaRAT uses a flexible configuration system that accepts settings such as organization name, API key, group designation, and server address as separate arguments or as a single Base64 string. This approach allows the same LabubaRAT binary to be reused across different targets and campaigns without modification. Before waiting for operator commands, the malware profiles the infected computer, gathering basic details like hostname, CPU model, and RAM, then checking what browsers and security software are installed. LabubaRAT looks for popular antivirus solutions, including Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and others by examining the Windows registry.

#3 — Remote Access Capabilities and Infrastructure

Notably, LabubaRAT itself does not include credential-stealing or network-spreading capabilities — those actions are left to the operator, who can use the malware's built-in remote access features to run additional tools as needed. The malware communicates over multiple channels: standard HTTPS requests with authentication tokens, embedded Microsoft Edge components, or DNS tunneling with encoded commands. LabubaRAT supports file transfers, screenshot capture, shell and PowerShell execution, JavaScript through Windows Script Host, and the ability to act as a network proxy. Three additional server IP addresses in Germany share the same control panel interface, suggesting LabubaRAT was deployed across multiple locations starting in early June 2026, indicating it was built as reusable infrastructure for multiple campaigns.


Recommendations

01

Enforce Signed-Binary Policy for Vendor-Themed Executables

Alert on unsigned executables that carry vendor version metadata claiming NVIDIA, Intel, AMD, or similar trusted origin, particularly when they execute from user-writable paths, temporary directories, or outside standard Program Files locations.

02

Detect Base64-Encoded Command Lines Paired with Persistence

Build detections for HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run entries that launch binaries with long Base64-like command-line arguments, especially where the decoded value reveals configuration fields such as --org, --key, --group, --server, --dns-domain, or --dns-resolver.

03

Hunt for Local Enrollment Artifacts

Search endpoints for the SQLite database nvctr_sys.db (and matching -wal and -shm files), the single-instance mutex Local\NVIDIAContainerMonitor_SingleInstance, and stored keys such as server_url, device_token, dns_domain, and polling interval values.

04

Monitor Unusual Parents for Shell and Script Execution

Alert on uncommon parent processes spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe; flag temporary files with a wupd_ prefix; and monitor for screen-capture GDI API sequences (GetDC, CreateCompatibleBitmap, BitBlt, GetDIBits) originating from non-graphics processes.

05

Strengthen Windows Script Host Coverage

Where possible, disable or restrict Windows Script Host on endpoints that do not require it, and where restriction is not feasible, enable Script Block and Module Logging equivalents for wscript.exe and cscript.exe so JScript execution matches the visibility available for PowerShell.

06

Segment and Monitor for SOCKS5 Relay Behavior

Apply network segmentation so that endpoints cannot arbitrarily initiate outbound tunnels to internet infrastructure, and detect SOCKS5 handshake patterns and long-lived outbound sessions from workstations that should not act as proxies.


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Type Value
SHA256 b7443b0ab48d2f5786d1b6f3a580f02621e9ae5a3877ee3a44e01df13d984328
MD5 d8bf355a198fb5db3ea65cfdfcdfbd19
Filename nvidia-sysruntime.exe, nvctr_sys.db
File Path nvidia_container.pdb, C:\Users\funt\.cargo\registry\
Mutex Local\NVIDIAContainerMonitor_SingleInstance
URL hxxps[:]//pipicka[.]xyz
IPv4 191[.]44[.]109[.]130, 87[.]120[.]108[.]18, 168[.]222[.]254[.]204

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

T1059.003
Execution
T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter — T1059.003: Windows Command Shell
T1059.001
Execution
T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter — T1059.001: PowerShell
T1059.007
Execution
T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter — T1059.007: JavaScript
T1547.001
Persistence
T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution — T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1027.013
Defense Evasion
T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information — T1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded File
T1036.005
Defense Evasion
T1036: Masquerading — T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1140
Defense Evasion
T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1518.001
Discovery
T1518: Software Discovery — T1518.001: Security Software Discovery
T1012
Discovery
T1012: Query Registry
T1082
Discovery
T1082: System Information Discovery
T1016
Discovery
T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
T1113
Collection
T1113: Screen Capture
T1560
Collection
T1560: Archive Collected Data
T1071.001
Command and Control
T1071: Application Layer Protocol — T1071.001: Web Protocols
T1071.004
Command and Control
T1071: Application Layer Protocol — T1071.004: DNS
T1132.001
Command and Control
T1132: Data Encoding — T1132.001: Standard Encoding
T1573
Command and Control
T1573: Encrypted Channel
T1090
Command and Control
T1090: Proxy
T1105
Command and Control
T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
T1568
Command and Control
T1568: Dynamic Resolution

References & Patch Links


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