Mirage Kitten Turns Job Interviews into a Gateway for Corporate Espionage

Red | Attack
Mirage Kitten Turns Job Interviews into a Gateway for Corporate Espionage | HiveForce Labs

Summary

Mirage Kitten (aka Nimbus Manticore), an Iran-linked cyberespionage group active since at least 2022, is targeting aviation, aerospace, and FinTech specialists across the Middle East and Africa with recruitment-themed social engineering. Fake recruiters on LinkedIn and other job-search platforms deliver trojanized coding-challenge archives hosted on an Amazon S3 bucket that bundle malicious npm packages. Running the project executes the group’s first Node.js- and JavaScript-based cross-platform remote access trojans, NodeRabbit and PollCat, granting remote access, host reconnaissance, credential and artifact harvesting, and file exfiltration across Windows, Linux, and macOS, with command-and-control concealed behind Microsoft Azure Websites and Cloudflare-backed domains.


Attack Details

Finding #1

Mirage Kitten, an Iran-linked cyberespionage group (also tracked as Nimbus Manticore, UNC1549, Smoke Sandstorm, and Iranian Dream Job), is targeting aviation, aerospace, and FinTech specialists across the Middle East and Africa, with confirmed victims in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. The operation opens with fake recruiter personas on LinkedIn and other job platforms: posing as a talent acquisition specialist at a major technology company, the actor invites a software engineer to complete a “technical assessment” and pressures them to download and run a coding-challenge archive hosted on an Amazon S3 bucket.

Finding #2

The lure is engineered for both stealth and urgency. One archive, Front-Technical-Challenge.zip, held a TaskFlow app whose README demanded frontend fixes within three hours, banned AI assistants (which would have flagged the malicious import), and falsely declared server.js off-limits, the one file the attackers had altered. Its first line loaded a trojanized npm package (colorized_terminal or pretty-log, v2.1.0) bundled locally, which silently launched the implant as a detached background process.

Finding #3

That implant is NodeRabbit, the group’s first Node.js remote access trojan, running on Windows, Linux, and macOS. It fingerprints the host, guards against re-execution, and persists per OS while masquerading as Microsoft Edge Update or Intel Driver & Support Assistant. Across three variants it adds sandbox evasion, corporate-proxy tunneling, Outlook email harvesting, a fake “GitHub Copilot Helper” VS Code extension, and Git-hook injection, growing to 23 commands.

Finding #4

A parallel lure (RankChallenge-react) delivered PollCat, an obfuscated-JavaScript RAT gated behind an attacker-supplied, rapidly expiring six-digit OTP to force speed. PollCat runs regardless of OTP success, registers with its C2, and profiles the host, inventorying processes and hunting for 24 security-vendor directories. Both RATs beacon over HTTP(S) to Microsoft Azure Websites and Cloudflare-backed domains, sometimes embedding the victim’s own name in the subdomain to blend in; NodeRabbit encrypts traffic with AES-256-GCM. Attribution to Mirage Kitten is high-confidence, resting on strong structural overlaps with its earlier Retrograde/MiniFast backdoor.


Recommendations

01
Contain Recruiter-Supplied Coding Assessments

Treat any coding challenge received through LinkedIn or a job platform as untrusted code and never run it on a production, domain-joined, or credential-bearing workstation. Require isolated, network-restricted VMs or containers, and flag lures that impose artificial urgency or forbid AI code review.

02
Block and Hunt for the Known Indicators

Ingest the Mirage Kitten hashes, C2 domains, URLs, filenames, and the MicrosoftEdgeUpdate Run-key indicator into EDR, SIEM, and firewall tooling, and alert on outbound connections to the listed Azure Websites and Cloudflare-backed domains, including subdomains embedding your organization’s name.

03
Audit npm Dependencies and Anomalous Node Execution

Sweep developer endpoints for the trojanized packages colorized_terminal and pretty-log pinned to version 2.1.0, and for any package loaded from a project-local node_modules directory never installed from the public registry, with particular attention to payloads under node_modules/.cache/.320697f1/.

04
Hunt Persistence Across Windows, Linux, and macOS

Search every operating system for the MicrosoftEdgeUpdate Run key; scheduled tasks named IntelDriverSupportUpdate and NetSync_<username>; WSL-launched daily 10 AM tasks; @reboot and daily cron entries; and macOS LaunchAgents such as com.microsoft.edgeupdate.plist. Inspect VS Code for a fake “GitHub Copilot Helper” extension and review Git hooks for the injected marker # shepherd-persist.


MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Resource Development
T1585
T1585: Establish Accounts — T1585.001: Social Media Accounts
Resource Development
T1583
T1583: Acquire Infrastructure — T1583.001: Domains / T1583.006: Web Services
Resource Development
T1608
T1608: Stage Capabilities — T1608.001: Upload Malware
Initial Access
T1566
T1566: Phishing — T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service
Execution
T1204
T1204: User Execution — T1204.002: Malicious File
Execution
T1059
T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter — T1059.007: JavaScript / T1059.003: Windows Command Shell
Persistence
T1547
T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution — T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence
T1053
T1053: Scheduled Task/Job — T1053.005: Scheduled Task / T1053.003: Cron
Persistence
T1543
T1543: Create or Modify System Process — T1543.001: Launch Agent
Persistence
T1176
T1176: Software Extensions — T1176.002: IDE Extensions
Persistence
T1546
T1546: Event Triggered Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1053
T1053: Scheduled Task/Job — T1053.005: Scheduled Task
Defense Evasion
T1036
T1036: Masquerading — T1036.004 / T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location
Defense Evasion
T1497
T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion — T1497.001: System Checks
Defense Evasion
T1027
T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion
T1140
T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Defense Evasion
T1070
T1070: Indicator Removal — T1070.004: File Deletion
Defense Evasion
T1564
T1564: Hide Artifacts — T1564.003: Hidden Window
Discovery
T1082
T1082: System Information Discovery
Discovery
T1057
T1057: Process Discovery
Discovery
T1083
T1083: File and Directory Discovery
Discovery
T1016
T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
Discovery
T1518
T1518: Software Discovery — T1518.001: Security Software Discovery
Collection
T1114
T1114: Email Collection — T1114.001: Local Email Collection
Collection
T1005
T1005: Data from Local System
Collection
T1560
T1560: Archive Collected Data — T1560.001: Archive via Utility
Command and Control
T1071
T1071: Application Layer Protocol — T1071.001: Web Protocols
Command and Control
T1573
T1573: Encrypted Channel — T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography
Command and Control
T1102
T1102: Web Service
Command and Control
T1008
T1008: Fallback Channels
Command and Control
T1105
T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
T1041
T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration
T1030
T1030: Data Transfer Size Limits

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

TypeValue
MD5CBAAF0900A13F28E380F49ADECEC932C, 1EA83E4E4592B01E4ACAB63EB867BEE5, 366515822D5AC1CC500711EF57A2E32E, CF449F1992C2819E62AC44A0B06AC2E7, E95A4366686E3F786EA3C056FAB5B0DA, DE5AF16A3757EF700B01DC34D67079AE, BE086789568441D0D7E4679AEE51F566, E259C5EDF158AAC4CFE14F77DDD0B196, 291AC3ABE73C5158E59A437B75D5F0AA, 0962F56D7EC69F4F2A0162DCBE22116B, 795E053A990A1569FFDCB57F48F6D085, 810F8E3B88EB05F710C09552941D6F56
Domainsoracle-challenge[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com, naturalapplication[.]azurewebsites[.]net, retaildemo[.]azurewebsites[.]net, tubitak[.]azurewebsites[.]net, rgbteller[.]azurewebsites[.]net, wslwebui[.]azurewebsites[.]net, plugplay[.]azurewebsites[.]net, crossdwm[.]azurewebsites[.]net, wdisystem[.]azurewebsites[.]net, wslmenus[.]azurewebsites[.]net, dnshnsdev[.]azurewebsites[.]net, hpjumpsrv[.]azurewebsites[.]net, storview[.]azurewebsites[.]net, healthcomfsdpower[.]com, visitfinancedentists[.]com, kyrasey-f8hfexa5cqamh7fk[.]westeurope-01[.]azurewebsites[.]net, greenyjsgfd[.]azurewebsites[.]net, helptellerbls[.]azurewebsites[.]net, timedrv[.]azurewebsites[.]net, userwellgtfs[.]azurewebsites[.]net, hecowime-aqdphyd4bbdef6es[.]westeurope-01[.]azurewebsites[.]net, msmanagementgrp[.]com, msmanagementgrpmedia[.]com, lifespotify[.]com, gamebarapp[.]azurewebsites[.]net, gamebarappinformation[.]azurewebsites[.]net, sahi-finance[.]com, healthful-hub[.]com, neumedicahealthcare[.]com, optimumhealthcredit[.]com, healthfullyrecipes[.]com, refreshhealthandwellness[.]com, healthvitalitycare[.]com, aceofspadesmanagement[.]com, glmediaagency[.]com, digimediaskill[.]com, healthyweightplan[.]com, mens-health-online[.]com
URLshxxps[:]//oracle-challenge[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/Front-Technical-Challenge[.]zip, hxxps[:]//lifespotify[.]com/api/users/b879746e-fed9-4211-a6da-4d8223681267/otp/validate
FilenamesFrontEnd-Task.zip, Front-Technical-Challenge.zip, Task-FullStack.zip, fullstack-1536.zip, webapp76592.zip, webapp76531.zip, challenges-17831.zip, challenges-17832.zip, Project-1802.zip, Case-34234.zip, RankChallenge-react-6uJSX3-main.zip, colorized_terminal, pretty-log, msedge_update.js, nodew.exe, idriver_support.js, IntelDSA.exe, requireObject.js, launcher.vbs
Registry KeyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate

References

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