
01 · Overview
Lazarus (aka Labyrinth Chollima, Group 77, Hastati Group, Zinc, Hidden Cobra, Diamond Sleet, Citrine Sleet, Jade Sleet, TraderTraitor, Gleaming Pisces, Slow Pisces) revived its long-running Operation Dream Job campaign, first seen in early July 2026, luring defense and aerospace staff across France, Germany, India, and Brazil with fake recruiter job offers. The intrusions chained an in-memory downloader (MISTPEN), a new backdoor (Troy), and an implant (ForestTiger) with a Windows zero-day, CVE-2026-68820 in AFD.sys, to gain SYSTEM privileges and load the FudModule 3.1 kernel rootkit. To stay hidden, the group routed command-and-control through legitimate cloud services and compromised WordPress, SharePoint, and Roundcube servers, exploiting the older CVE-2025-49113 to plant the RelayShell web shell.
| CVE ID | Name | Affected Product |
|---|---|---|
CVE-2026-68820 | Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Use-After-Free Vulnerability Zero-Day | Microsoft Windows |
CVE-2025-49113 | RoundCube Webmail Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability | Roundcube Webmail |
02 · Technical Breakdown
Lazarus has been exploiting the Windows zero-day vulnerability CVE-2026-68820 as part of its long-running Operation Dream Job campaign, and each intrusion opened with a recruitment lure. Posing as recruiters for well-known defense and technology firms, the group approached targets, most likely over LinkedIn or messaging apps, and steered them toward downloading malicious files. Two delivery paths ran in parallel. In the first, the victim received an encrypted ZIP holding a legitimately signed PDF viewer, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload disguised as a PDF; launching the viewer side-loaded the rogue libmupdf.dll, which showed a convincing decoy job description while quietly unpacking and running code in memory. In the second, victims were told to install "SecurityPDF," a trojanized open-source PDF viewer offered through at least three fake Enveil websites that ranked highly in search results, and opening a specially prepared PDF through it triggered a hidden payload.
Once running, the first chain loaded MISTPEN, an in-memory downloader that profiled the machine and pulled additional modules for host and process reconnaissance, screenshot capture, and privilege escalation. MISTPEN reached its operators through legitimate cloud services, using the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive to blend in with normal traffic. Its privilege-escalation loader negotiated a session key using the ML-KEM post-quantum algorithm, then used that key to decrypt and run FudModule 3.1, Lazarus's kernel-mode rootkit. The second chain instead decrypted and loaded the Troy backdoor directly into memory, handing operators remote control through 17 commands covering reconnaissance, file upload and download, archiving and exfiltration, hidden shell execution, process termination, in-memory DLL injection, and changes to beacon timing.
To gain SYSTEM privileges, the attackers exploited CVE-2026-68820, a use-after-free flaw in the Windows AFD.sys WinSock driver that had not yet been patched when the campaign began in early July. With SYSTEM access, FudModule 3.1 worked to blind defenders by disabling EDR telemetry, interfering with security products, and, in a new twist, tampering with Windows Smart App Control by resetting its policy state and forcing an in-place reload of the code-integrity policy from within a SYSTEM-level msiexec.exe process. The rootkit also injected a fresh copy of MISTPEN into a SYSTEM process so the implant could run with elevated rights and out of sight of monitoring tools.
Rather than build its own servers, Lazarus hid inside trusted infrastructure. The group hijacked legitimate but compromised WordPress and SharePoint sites and Roundcube webmail servers to relay command-and-control traffic for ForestTiger, its remote-access implant. Many of those Roundcube servers still ran versions vulnerable to CVE-2025-49113, so the attackers likely authenticated with stolen credentials and then exploited the PHP object-deserialization flaw to plant RelayShell, a previously undocumented web shell that exchanges commands and results as text files. In at least one case a compromised France-based organization was used to send spear-phishing to fresh targets, letting the messages slip past reputation-based filters. Data collected on victim hosts was staged, archived, and exfiltrated over these blended channels.
03 · Mitigation
Apply Microsoft's August Patch Tuesday update across all Windows 10, Windows 11 (including builds 26100 and 26200), and Windows Server systems without delay, prioritizing internet-exposed and privileged hosts to close CVE-2026-68820.
Upgrade any Roundcube instance to version 1.5.10 or 1.6.11 or later, and audit self-hosted webmail for the RelayShell web shell and unexpected text-file command artifacts tied to CVE-2025-49113.
Search endpoints for the SecurityPDF application and for PDF documents containing the marker string "This document is encrypted with sumatrapdf reader!!!!!!!!!!!!", which triggers execution of the embedded payload.
Monitor for anomalous Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive activity from endpoints that have no business reason to call them, a technique MISTPEN uses to hide command-and-control.
Instruct staff to install applications only from vendor-verified sources rather than search-result links, since the attackers deliberately rank fake vendor sites highly to appear legitimate.
Train employees in sensitive roles to treat unsolicited recruiter outreach and job-offer attachments with caution, especially requests to download a viewer or open an "encrypted" document.
Reset credentials for any exposed Roundcube or webmail accounts and require phishing-resistant MFA to counter the stolen-credential access observed in this campaign.
04 · Adversary Tradecraft
CVE-2026-68820.05 · Forensic Markers
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA256 | 2b4987c07a3d9a9a5d1a9bf4efa3d1903e775090b611710edafdc92874265ca83a02d0d798e8d35555776886d92b20ff38a101c9ef7e0eebc8ce5d259516525a92106b0c62a0a42678232f8273f030b2d3c8e92efce81b98b9eec70cfe98afa1396192d92d17ace1a521f1351eeeba2825e60badd0d799cc5c338e4934b3c82cf7e620134ca935067797ab957317b346ce0df84a4e9b9ca54a6acc9b75afda4d75b93a7103b0562f6497d30052c0c5cf7aa58c1bf0e9297022b74469a7f096f1a45144d22cac70a45d71cf4dffa4efbc373658779a56cf1300d6ac863d6cc7e21de949c71efcfb0ffc41f33d38833dbc4b082075b1a540fc68c18c535d7ad86c4c9b804d6155b29f1e27a9ffe531e10bc42a7bdab42f905b50146bf2026768d929e24c007549e51319ff3aee011da6f9f93568e8c85a5ad69c9e53bd3f4533a24ebdce2f47c23ff8c9e8e80c8b5239c7a5764da31cd3ab8f0505926890adc105c2aa28bb5e2a749c693712008276f311edd912f689371ef9e8a1ee5fb41674612db25ac41a66aa523c79e23e00443573530dd7bd82b8371bcc87bd7232e141eb5278ee922838352f1480a73e971161017d643a80b7ec22bf725897dfd088696db4082d21070d9ddf53fde4ea22524d09e41ec9826ce63cef3c6235e458d21afbfb3fc5626f68677fb1269a2fefbe70e719211b4065e836ab92e06a8210139a2dea7056f2bf36c66a61ff787ff5be975a85f534c3c5ca178791dac2504db2c61913d10bc99f7f7abe7ee0902be87920b73b2ea41bd9683dbfcad340dacbcdef794fd32432341dfcf54d0517a6bbc38e5d265be70933493e4183c2a340cdde9a2d4dd792c9f672bbdcc8d363d745994efe90f4ffc5fdc2c059c8e379a48ad6a68aba96c603e44046de703c67b2c3b7e4ca974afef7b437a0244418bc4edc781bb772dccae85e062f541fecad9ec7a18a3123e7ae5ac5d53c91709b53a46dbbd289231b1ef8b95bf77887d5377e2a60f649035e78f543af1b82877db36a5759d8586da9b1e6f3315ceb77dd14a937a26cc3602bf6a7e2c2ecafb3c65ce5319837bea0578a2b7821d7e2c573530648f26d7a0d98b373ab24fb7f0c792736761e542d82268052f94df6f4870d02e57b18d4c54136cc7a8c8d80ad162631f99462c9433b6378df8442e63a6ed7317075913e4720847a510d95022d4a8347b2637c245da673ae661593c0de9bbb815593b816a6853dad6d55ad5042d2ef1875cd13d6e78ce6c29f92dc45b1474417cbdff4ed0c18e58fa63e3a071ee9f85aa9d2aac07cacb97cec84e08b89f41967a24e965d1fd2c51751cef158f7aa35bb4306b87b973601060c62edeeaa49def6a13be6e126e1024ce011faad4e2d9f585ccf6bd5a6fecf12088843801215898442bd1ff3e266f29d14e29a94780e857f69c4915d6bd578c28c9afe7457a0d81f6701332ef8197e8f7468de654935fb29a50ea66459743172aab606974b054a64561534ae66baa3a840657f79d7c6fa18350e8d45d1db3d69b7eeda2e35e23006bf4b7e206281fce809584207214fc213f9bc30376d590fb6ae19480d694e08ee85859cad8066f2f87e7e5abba2960c6d115e1615d668d4fba7b1300a59cd6212c08910a260cd71b40cd9f51cac933030a68faac0bba738059ce07c951c31ab2da3d93d8f69bff32f9b7d933dbf5943441b9cc9907521c3ad4838c4324bc5f081021da5fb2e9073d0c9304087811c21eb47c9e22762cc4e06aa378a190f71384c03023bb3d18a6d66e297d46701220e132963d2e222
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| Domains | envell[.]xyzenveil[.]onlineuxtramine[.]org
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| IPv4 | 135[.]181[.]67[.]203135[.]181[.]185[.]158
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06 · Further Reading
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