Signed, Sealed, Stolen: CrashStealer Slips Past Gatekeeper

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CrashStealer: macOS Information Stealer Bypasses Gatekeeper via Notarized Dropper | HivePro Threat Advisory TA2026198
Threat Advisory • Attack Report

Signed, Sealed, Stolen: CrashStealer Slips Past Gatekeeper

A newly identified macOS information stealer, CrashStealer, disguises itself as Apple's legitimate CrashReporter utility to bypass Gatekeeper and harvest credentials, keychain secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets across the globe.

Admiralty Code: A1 TA Number: TA2026198 Malware: CrashStealer Platform: macOS First Seen: May 2026
Date of Publication
July 14, 2026
Admiralty Code
A1
TA Number
TA2026198
First Seen
May 2026
Targeted Regions
Worldwide
Targeted Platform
macOS
Malware
CrashStealer
Malware Type
Information Stealer
Delivery Vector
Notarized Dropper

Summary

CrashStealer is a newly identified macOS information stealer that disguises itself as Apple's legitimate CrashReporter utility to slip past both users and security tooling. First seen in May 2026, CrashStealer targets victims worldwide on the macOS platform. The malware reaches victims through a signed, Apple-notarized dropper served from a fake software site, letting it clear macOS Gatekeeper without warnings.

Once running, CrashStealer shows a fake password prompt, validates the entered credential locally, unlocks the login keychain, and harvests browser logins, cryptocurrency wallet extensions, password-manager vaults, and user files. The stolen data is encrypted client-side with AES-256-GCM, zipped, and exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server over libcurl, making CrashStealer a significant credential-theft and cryptocurrency-theft risk for macOS users and organizations alike.


Attack Details

#1
Notarized Delivery via Fake Software Site

CrashStealer is a newly surfaced macOS information stealer that poses as Apple's crash-reporting utility to make off with credentials, keychain secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets. Its infection begins on a polished fake software site tied to the domain werkbit[.]io, which was registered in late June 2026. The download is deliberately gated behind a meeting PIN, so the malicious installer is served only to visitors who arrive with the correct code, keeping the operation low-profile and out of reach of casual scanning.

The first-stage payload arrives as a signed, Apple-notarized disk image ("Werkbit Setup," delivered as Werkbit.app) carrying a valid developer ID, Emil Grigorov (WWB7JA7AQV). Because both the disk image and its binary are notarized, they clear macOS Gatekeeper without any warning. After the image mounts, the installer nudges the victim into running it by presenting a setup screen that instructs them to right-click the app and choose "Open."

#2
Staged Payload Delivery and Persistence

Once launched, the embedded veltod executable reaches out to a GitHub repository (github.com/mgothiclove) and pulls down a file named sys.cache. That file yields a curl command used to fetch a shell script, which in turn stages the next payload, CrashReporter.dmg, into the /tmp directory. The final binary masquerades as Apple's CrashReporter.app, borrowing the genuine tool's name, icon, and metadata.

CrashStealer establishes persistence by installing a LaunchAgent called com.apple.crashreporter.helper, then copies and re-signs itself; re-signing rewrites the code-signature data so the file's hash changes while the underlying code stays identical, defeating simple hash-based detection. Throughout, the malware resists analysis with control-flow flattening, encrypted strings, and layered anti-debugging, and it enumerates installed security and analysis tooling before doing anything noisy.

#3
Keychain Compromise and Data Harvesting

To reach the keychain, CrashStealer presents a fake macOS password prompt framed as a routine system authorization requiring administrator privileges. When the victim types their password, the malware validates it locally using dscl, the Directory Service command-line tool, and re-prompts on failure to ensure it captures a working credential.

With a valid password in hand, CrashStealer unlocks the login keychain and begins collecting broadly: credentials and cookies from Chromium-family browsers and Firefox, roughly 80 cryptocurrency wallet extensions, 14 password managers, and files from the user's Documents and Downloads folders, while intentionally skipping large media files, installers, and system directories to stay lean.

#4
Encrypted Exfiltration to Command-and-Control

Before anything leaves the host, CrashStealer encrypts the collected data client-side using AES-256-GCM, an unusually strong choice for a commodity-style stealer, and packages it into hidden ZIP archives. It then uploads the compressed bundle to its command-and-control server at 179[.]43[.]166[.]242 using libcurl.

The discovery of additional domains and shared backend infrastructure tied to the same operation suggests CrashStealer is one component of a larger, multi-platform campaign rather than a standalone tool.


Recommendations

01

Block CrashStealer Infrastructure

Immediately block the known delivery domain (werkbit[.]io), the GitHub staging path (github.com/mgothiclove), and the C2 IP address 179[.]43[.]166[.]242 at your DNS, web proxy, and firewall layers.

02

Hunt for the Malicious LaunchAgent

Search macOS endpoints for a LaunchAgent named com.apple.crashreporter.helper and for any CrashReporter.app running outside its legitimate system location; the genuine Apple CrashReporter does not install itself as a user LaunchAgent.

03

Reset Exposed Credentials and Keychain Secrets

On any host that ran the dropper, assume browser logins, keychain items (Safari logins, Wi-Fi and app passwords, private keys, certificates, and tokens), password-manager vaults, and crypto wallets are compromised; rotate passwords, revoke tokens, and move wallet funds using a separate, clean device.

04

Scrutinize "Right-Click to Open" Prompts

Coach users to be suspicious of any installer that tells them to bypass macOS security by right-clicking and selecting "Open," and of unexpected password prompts raised by apps such as a supposed crash reporter.

05

Restrict Software to Trusted Sources

Enforce installation only from the App Store or vetted internal repositories, and be wary of niche software sites that gate their downloads behind codes or PINs.

06

Prioritize Behavior-Based macOS Detection

Because CrashStealer re-signs itself to change its hash, lean on behavioral detections (LaunchAgent creation, dscl password validation, keychain access, bulk browser and wallet file reads, and libcurl-based exfiltration) rather than static hash matching alone.


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeValue
Domains werkbit[.]io, cohezo[.]io, cohezo[.]com, cordinex[.]io, synerix[.]app, collabox[.]uk, werknova[.]co
IPv4 179[.]43[.]166[.]242
Filenames Werkbit.app, veltod, sys.cache, CrashReporter.dmg, CrashReporter.app, com.apple.crashreporter.helper
URLs hxxps[:]//github[.]com/mgothiclove, hxxps[:]//github[.]com/mgothiclove/pkeys/blob/main/sys[.]cache, hxxps[:]//raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/mgothiclove/pkeys/main/sys[.]cache, hxxps[:]//endpoint-api-v1[.]com/d/f1b24e, hxxp[:]//endpoint-api-v1[.]com/d/f1b24e/download, hxxps[:]//icky-lyrical[.]com, hxxps[:]//icky-lyrical[.]com/api/download?access_code=<redacted>&type=werkbit&os=Mac, hxxps[:]//icky-lyrical[.]com/storage/secure/werkbit/mac, hxxps[:]//icky-lyrical[.]com/storage/secure/Cohezo/windows/small/69cf7d0ea7cfd/cohezo_setup[.]msi, hxxps[:]//cohezo[.]io/download?invite=OX-3SEY-64KI, hxxps[:]//cordinex[.]io/download?invite=MZ-AB95-QD50, hxxps[:]//cohezo[.]com/calendar/0f4df3a7-5914-4245-a616-311ca554ee0c, hxxps[:]//collabox[.]uk/calendar/1cdf0e32-9ba0-4be5-8823-39a2e6364a20, hxxps[:]//synerix[.]app/calendar/144f20fc-c7fb-4e58-9544-75fe9099b61c, hxxps[:]//synerix[.]app/calendar/a711f30b-b9bc-4f31-9c8e-869e7c1b2c1f, hxxps[:]//werknova[.]co/calendar/90f99c64-9fcc-451c-bae1-0b095c04e5c8
SHA256 3a9d703ba7f7564399365db7ab8b04238806ef7a53df0b6822f32b80bf0f5a80, 88334ea00ff94a366cd2a9283a508b97c269839894fddfe91913f3d92e95b6ab, f3857c0b84a24b7fc912d55f8b14c67c23d5837b1a6932164d5d62273d4affeb, a1966a6d6f54a025f30d55571d21d6537977ca73ffa734c13494b9c806cd7007, 5bb675af9c403896d5f31611cf42304cf482d16f6f3ab6a868a9aa853aa5c179, 08801f81960cd8c1077b4aa2e8124840d56a272842fdcc73263c9968e787e0bd, 09bd60ce11ee4324e2052a439a08676e31aac787edda3f9bd02325390b5db2d2, 4ed199e27a4dc193468569b221b19180e5ae95cab8df84d92e082b68d33672f5, 81ef05cc4d07cd22cd7cd7099f278dd9b9a3ae8ad4770b3d387892e1c6cfb7d7, fba5bbe87fa351eedf2f3c16653cc9e4196d73604529bb50a609e2d3ebf1828b
File Paths /private/tmp/.CrashReporter/CrashReporter.app/Contents/MacOS/CrashReporter, ~/Library/Caches/com.apple.crashreporter/CrashReporter.app, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.crashreporter.helper.plist, ~/.cache/com.apple.crashreporter/, ~/.cache/com.apple.crashreporter/.zx_<8-hex>.zip, ~/.cache/com.apple.crashreporter/.brw_<random>/Keychain/login.keychain-db, ~/.cache/com.apple.crashreporter/.brw_<random>/password.txt, ~/.cache/.sys_auth, /private/tmp/agent_crash_marker

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Execution
T1204
User ExecutionT1204.002: Malicious File
Execution
T1059
Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.004: Unix Shell
Persistence
T1543
Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.001: Launch Agent
Defense Evasion
T1553
Subvert Trust ControlsT1553.002: Code Signing
Defense Evasion
T1036
MasqueradingT1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location
Defense Evasion
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion
T1622
Debugger Evasion
Defense Evasion
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Discovery
T1518
Software DiscoveryT1518.001: Security Software Discovery
Credential Access
T1056
Input CaptureT1056.002: GUI Input Capture
Credential Access
T1555
Credentials from Password StoresT1555.001: KeychainT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersT1555.005: Password Managers
Collection
T1005
Data from Local System
Collection
T1560
Archive Collected Data
Command and Control
T1102
Web ServiceT1102.001: Dead Drop Resolver
Command and Control
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control
T1071
Application Layer ProtocolT1071.001: Web Protocols
Exfiltration
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References


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